A survey on resiliency techniques in cloud computing infrastructures and applications by Colman-Meixner, Carlos et al.
A Survey on Resiliency Techniques in Cloud
Computing Infrastructures and Applications
Carlos Colman-Meixner, Chris Develder∗, Massimo Tornatore†, and Biswanath Mukherjee
University of California, Davis, USA, ∗Ghent University – iMinds, Belgium, †Politecnico di Milano, Italy
{cecolmanmeixner, mtornatore, bmukherjee}@ucdavis.edu, ∗chris.develder@intec.ugent.be, †tornator@elet.polimi.it
Abstract—Today’s businesses increasingly rely on cloud com-
puting, which brings both great opportunities and challenges.
One of the critical challenges is resiliency: disruptions due to
failures (either accidental or because of disasters or attacks)
may entail significant revenue losses (e.g., US$ 25.5 billion in
2010 for North America). Such failures may originate at any of
the major components in a cloud architecture (and propagate to
others): (i) the servers hosting the application, (ii) the network
interconnecting them (on different scales, inside a data center,
up to wide-area connections), or (iii) the application itself.
We comprehensively survey a large body of work focusing on
resilience of cloud computing, in each (or a combination) of the
server, network, and application components.
First, we present the cloud computing architecture and its key
concepts. We highlight both the infrastructure (servers, network)
and application components. A key concept is virtualization of
infrastructure (i.e., partitioning into logically separate units), and
thus we detail the components in both physical and virtual layers.
Before moving to the detailed resilience aspects, we provide a
qualitative overview of the types of failures that may occur
(from the perspective of the layered cloud architecture), and their
consequences.
The second major part of the paper introduces and categorizes
a large number of techniques for cloud computing infrastructure
resiliency. This ranges from designing and operating the facilities,
servers, networks, to their integration and virtualization (e.g., also
including resilience of the middleware infrastructure).
The third part focuses on resilience in application design and
development. We study how applications are designed, installed,
and replicated to survive multiple physical failure scenarios as
well as disaster failures.
Index Terms—Cloud computing, resilience, virtualization, mid-
dleware, optical networks, disaster resilience.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1960s, the visionary computer scientist John Mc-
Carthy predicted the evolution towards service-oriented sys-
tems, such as today’s cloud computing [1]. Thirty years later,
the age of service-oriented computation (SOC) started with
the advent of the Internet, that quickly became the worldwide
network needed to enable novel cloud services (e.g., email
and web services). Convergence of multiple driving forces
(i.e., the new SOC paradigm, the rising software industry,
high-performance distributed computing, virtualization, and
a renewed business interest) paved the road towards the
realization of cloud computing [2].
The first widely-available cloud computing service was im-
plemented and commercialized by Amazon in 2006 (EC2/S3
[3]). The concept was standardized by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2009 [4]. Since then,
the importance of cloud computing has risen steadily: Forbes
magazine highlighted a market growth of 34% per year and
a US$ 19 billion market for 2016 [5]. Yet, with that growth
also came the challenges faced by the information technology
(IT) industry and service providers to satisfy the increasing
demand and diversity of cloud computing services. A major
challenge that needs to be overcome to support that growth and
thus the massive migration of business services to the cloud
is resiliency.
Indeed, even a single physical or software element failure
may cause major disruption and severe effects on business rev-
enues [6]: e.g., losses from cloud application and infrastructure
failures are estimated at US$ 273 million in 2007–2013, for 28
cloud service providers, given 1,600 hours of disruptions [7].
We define the term resiliency as the capacity of a system
or an infrastructure or a business to remain reliable, failure
tolerant, survivable (i.e., recoverable), dependable, and secure
(i.e., incorruptible) in case of any malicious or accidental
malfunctions or failures that result in a temporal or permanent
service disruption [8], [9], [10] (see Glossary in Section VIII).
In this work, we comprehensively survey a large set of
studies focusing on resiliency in cloud computing, classified
into two major groups: (1) resiliency in infrastructure and
(2) resiliency in applications.
Approaches for resiliency in cloud infrastructure are de-
signed for the physical and virtualization layers of cloud
infrastructure providers. ‘Virtualization’ means the logical
partitioning of physical resources, to increase their utilization
by sharing them among multiple users. In a cloud context,
‘resources’ include processing capacity (located in data cen-
ters) and communication network capacity (within the data
center, or on a larger, wide-area scale, providing inter-data
center connectivity). Earlier surveys on resiliency focused on
just a segment of the present-day cloud infrastructure, e.g.,
specifically for communication networks [11], [12] or data
centers [13], [14]. Our survey, on the other hand, provides
a holistic view of all cloud computing components and also
covers integrated cloud resiliency, focusing on combined com-
munication and computation infrastructures.
The main aim of the proposed approaches for resiliency in
cloud applications is to reduce the failure’s negative impact at
the cloud application level, where the service provider interacts
with end users. Approaches in this group are classified into:
(i) resilient application development, (ii) resilient application
collaboration, and (iii) resilient application management.
1
We will discuss the surveyed resilience studies by consid-
ering different aspects. The first aspect concerns the layers of
the cloud system architecture, with three1 high-level layers
as proposed in [16]: (i) application, (ii) virtualization, and
(iii) physical layer. These layers also relate to the service
model where applications deliver services over the Internet,
and infrastructure, i.e., systems are in data centers [17]. The
second aspect is the type of cloud service disruption: the cause
and severity of the failure that is considered [6], [18]. The third
aspect relates to key additional functionality provided by cloud
computing with respect to traditional SOC (virtualization,
multi-tenancy, geo-distribution and ubiquitous access, dynamic
resource provisioning, self-adaptability, etc.) [2], [15]. Finally,
we consider the fundamental resiliency techniques to counter
failures (e.g., forecasting, pre-provisioning of extra capacity
for protection, and post-failure recovery).
Section II starts by clarifying the cloud architecture and
associated terminology. Section III gives a general overview of
cloud service disruptions, and introduces the terminology used
to describe their causes, severity, and financial consequences.
In Section IV, we explain the main conceptual solutions to
those disruptions, to come to a classification of resiliency
strategies that we subsequently adopt to survey the studies
detailing the solutions. We partition the studies in two top-
level categories: Section V discusses the infrastructure re-
silience, while Section VI covers application-layer resiliency.
Section VII concludes the paper with a summary of the major
approaches (and how they compare), an analysis of major
trends, and open problems in cloud resiliency followed by a
glossary of important terms in Section VIII and references.
II. CLOUD COMPUTING CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
Here, we first summarize the cloud service model (Sec-
tion II-A) and functionality that cloud computing provides
beyond traditional service oriented computing (Section II-B).
Readers familiar with cloud computing can directly move
to our model and terminology of the architectural layers in
Section II-C.
A. Service model
The cloud computing service model is usually referred
to by an acronym “XaaS” (X-as-a-service, where X can be
any offered cloud service) [16], [17]. Among the numerous
Xs, three baseline services are defined by NIST: (1) Soft-
ware-as-a-Service (SaaS), that provides access to online soft-
ware applications to one or more tenants and/or end users (e.g.,
Dropbox, Google Docs); (2) Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS),
where a platform such as an operating system or an application
development framework is provided to users (e.g., Amazon
Web Service (AWS), Salesforce.com, MS Windows Azure);
(3) Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), where, of a given cloud
network infrastructure, a fraction of the connectivity, process-
ing, and storage capacities are provided to one or many tenants
1Note that some previous surveys have also suggested a four-layer model of
application, platform, infrastructure, and hardware [15]. However, we choose
the three-layer model suggested in [16] for the sake of simplicity.
(e.g., the EC2 cloud of Amazon [3], [16], [19]). According to
[15], a PaaS provider’s cloud is very likely to run on top of
an IaaS provider’s cloud, and many PaaS and IaaS providers
tend to be the same organization. For these reasons, in this
survey, we refer to a SaaS provider as “cloud application
service provider” and to PaaS and IaaS provider as “cloud
infrastructure service provider”, as suggested in [17].
B. Cloud functionalities beyond traditional SOC
Functionalities that cloud computing provide with respect
to traditional service-oriented computing include the follow-
ing [4]:
1. Virtualization provides physical resource partitioning with
adaptability and privacy. Virtualization is largely adopted to
achieve resource sharing, with isolation, and enables Migra-
tion (see Glossary in Section VIII). There are three levels
of virtualization: (i) application, (ii) operating system, and
(iii) hardware [20]. Virtualized applications imply separate
user spaces with specific isolated application instances (i.e.,
sessions). Operating-system level virtualization creates inde-
pendent and isolated operating systems with all functionalities
and attributes (i.e., virtual machines, VM). Hardware virtual-
ization is the slicing of hardware resources (e.g., virtual optical
networks) [20] (see Glossary in Section VIII).
2. Multi-tenancy is the possibility for multiple service
providers to share the physical infrastructure of a single oper-
ator and/or for one service provider to use physical infrastruc-
ture of multiple operators [15]. Multi-tenancy can be adopted
to increase resiliency (e.g., SecondSite [21]), assuming that
failures affecting multiple providers are unlikely.
3. Dynamic resource provisioning allows resources to be
leased and released from a pool, whenever needed. Most
approaches for resiliency in physical infrastructure exploit it
(e.g., Self-Adaptive Cloud Collaboration (SACC) [22]).
4. Geo-distribution and ubiquitous access allow services and
data to be accessed from anywhere. These characteristics are
shared with SOC and are also largely employed in support of
disaster resiliency, e.g., when moving content to avoid massive
disruption due to an expected disaster (e.g., DeepSky [23]).
5. Self-adaptability (i.e., self-migration and self-
reorganization) consists in the leasing and releasing of
resources on demand from cloud providers by using
automated resource-management features to reorganize their
cloud computing infrastructures and respond efficiently to
rapid changes in service demand (e.g., flash-crowd effects).
Some approaches exploit this functionality by offering
automatic failure mitigation in cloud computing operations
(e.g., NetPilot [24]).
C. Layered cloud architecture
We now introduce the three-layer cloud architecture sug-
gested in [16] and the taxonomy of components presented in
[25]. Figure 1 illustrates the following layers, with sample
organizations whose core businesses relate to the respective
layer:
2
Fig. 1. Cloud computing and cloud service disruption.
1. The application layer is the upper-most layer of the hierar-
chy where data and applications reside, and has four building
blocks [25]:
1.a) End-user functions include end users’ and tenants’
interfaces and functionalities, e.g., web interfaces;
1.b) End-users’ application programming interface (EAPI)
defines an interface for development and customization of
users’ or tenants’ applications;
1.c) Application core includes the engine of each cloud
application, e.g., Customer Relation Management (CRM),
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP); and
1.d) Information manages two different granularities of
information, data and metadata [25].
2. The virtualization layer supports the application demands
by organizing, managing, and providing access to resources of
the physical layer, and comprises four building blocks [25]:
2.a) Integration and middleware components provide the
infrastructure with application development frameworks, mid-
dleware capabilities, and useful functions such as database
access, message interchanging, and queuing (e.g., a MapRe-
duce interface). This building block also provides basic server
functionalities for fundamental applications (e.g., email, web)
and secure authentication functionalities (e.g., identity man-
ager and authentication protocols) as a platform.
2.b) Programming interfaces for middleware comprise a
set of APIs for IaaS tenants to support their interaction with
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the infrastructure (e.g., the Restful Web Service API used by
Amazon and GoGrid).
2.c) Core connectivity and delivery manage the connectivity
to the infrastructure and define virtual topologies: Internet
Protocol (IP) address management (IPAM) for internal and
external IP addresses; Domain name system (DNS) for trans-
lation of IaaS tenants’ IPs and domains (e.g., automatic AWS
DNS name assignment); load balancers (LB) and transport
which distribute workloads across servers, network links (e.g.,
AWS Auto-Scaling); identity access management (e.g., AWS
credentials and X.509 certificates) functionality with network
firewalls to control the access and provide security for the
infrastructure and IaaS tenants’ data.
2.d) Abstraction and virtual components provide abstrac-
tion and virtualization of physical infrastructure for the ten-
ants’ platforms and applications. This building block defines
and controls the virtual machines (VMs) and virtual digital
sites (VDS) by using hypervisors (virtual machine manager,
VMM, and Xen), and maps virtual networks (VNets/VNs)
integrated in cloud networks (CNs) over a substrate physical
infrastructure (see Glossary in Section VIII).
3. The physical layer provides physical resources for com-
putation, communication, and storage data by defining two
building blocks:
3.a) Hardware comprises the core data center equipment,
i.e., a pool of servers or physical machines (i.e., PM) con-
nected using an intra-data center network composed of, e.g.,
switches and routers. Cloud infrastructure providers typically
manage a network of data centers, connected by core networks
(i.e., the inter-data center network).
3.b) Facilities refer to the supporting equipment compris-
ing power systems and HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning).
Figure 2 shows three cloud infrastructure providers manag-
ing their virtualized infrastructure (i.e., servers, networks, data
centers, networks of data centers, and facilities) by providing
geographically-distributed and ubiquitous access to VMs for
multi-tenant cloud applications. Some tenant’s applications are
for private usage, while others provide services for end users
(i.e., SaaS).
III. CLOUD SERVICE DISRUPTION
Before we detail the actual studies in subsequent sections,
we first provide an overview of the causes of cloud service
disruptions, the severity of the impacts, and their associated
costs.
A. Causes of cloud service disruptions
Figure 1 illustrates what layers the various main causes have
an effect on. The main causes can be characterized as follows:
1. Human errors: failures induced by human actions, unin-
tentionally or intentionally. When produced unintentionally,
the error can be typically controlled and fixed (e.g., a cloud
operator accidentally erases the profile of a user or shuts
down some vital components). However, some errors can be
Fig. 2. Three cloud infrastructure providers in different geographical zones
(i.e., US west coast, US east coast, and Europe); six tenants (i.e., SaaS
application services and private business and sites); and two types of end
users, using virtualization, multi-tenancy, and geo-distributed and ubiquitous
access functionality of cloud computing.
intentionally produced by attacks or sabotage to destroy or
disrupt cloud services and data [26].
2. Software failures: caused by software bugs, software aging,
errors in the application design, and malicious software (e.g., a
virus). Grottke et al. [27] present a taxonomy of these failures.
3. Physical failures: physical component outages. These fail-
ures propagate vertically along the cloud system hierarchy
(i.e., they start from the physical layer and propagate to the
virtualization and application layers). Such failures can also
propagate horizontally, affecting multiple hardware compo-
nents (e.g., a failure of a server may produce post-failure traffic
overload, subsequently failing more servers).
4. Disasters: natural disasters (tornadoes, earthquakes, etc.)
or human-induced ones (e.g., weapons of mass destruction,
WMD). These failure scenarios often have a high impact, as
they can propagate to the higher layers with a cascade of
physical failures, software failures, and human errors.
B. Impact of cloud service disruptions
We classify the service disruption severity in four levels of
increasing impact [18]:
1. Masked disruption, when the service provider can recover
failed components without causing service disruption for end
users and tenants.
2. Degraded service, when offered services get reduced in
quality, but are not interrupted. Some degradations may incur
penalties (see next subsection).
3. Unreachable service, when the service or data still resides
in the servers, but cannot be accessed by end users or tenants.
This is the most common case for network communication
failures.
4. Corrupted service, when the service cannot be recovered
and end users and tenants lose critical data and associated
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revenues and might initiate legal actions against the cloud
service provider.
C. Consequences of cloud service disruptions
Cloud service providers, tenants, and users confront three
different costs or losses induced by cloud service disruption:
1. Repair costs: paid by the cloud service provider when
failures affect cloud components. Vishwanath et al. [28]
provide a quantitative evaluation of the effect of failures in
servers of large data centers. The study observed failures and
replacement of servers of about 8% of 100,000 servers (i.e.,
8,000 servers) in a period of 14 months, amounting to a total
repair cost (without considering penalty) of around US$ 2.5
million. Similar results are reported in another study performed
on the Google cloud infrastructure [18].
2. Penalty costs: incurred by cloud application and cloud
infrastructure providers when cloud services are disrupted by
reducing their availability. As an example, the availability and
penalty costs incurred by 28 cloud service providers due to
service disruptions in 2007–2013 were estimated to amount
to over US$ 273 million [7].
3. Business revenue losses: the missed business opportunities,
in an extended sense, due to cloud service outages. This can
be very significant, given the dependency of today’s business
on cloud computing services: [29] estimates a loss of US$ 25.5
billion for the year 2010, considering total or partial service
disruptions in North American businesses.
IV. CLASSIFICATION OF RESILIENCY APPROACHES IN
CLOUD COMPUTING
We now present the classification of resiliency in cloud
computing, as adopted in the rest of the paper.
A. Resiliency strategies
Starting from the traditional classification of network
resilience [11] and information technology resilience [9], we
develop a comprehensive classification to cover all resiliency
methods in cloud systems (i.e., methods applicable to cloud
infrastructures as well as cloud applications). Our comprehen-
sive classification comprises failure forecasting and removal,
protection, and restoration:
1. Failure forecasting and removal: consists in using measure-
ments and/or estimations of possible failures and their conse-
quences for the system to enhance system preparedness. For
cloud infrastructure providers, failure forecasting and removal
imply the reorganization of their infrastructure or software
components to reduce or remove negative effects of failures
before they occur. Degrading service can be considered as
a removal approach because no additional capacity is pre-
provisioned.
An example of failure forecasting and removal is resilient
virtual machine migration using traffic demand estimation.
2. Protection: consists in pre-deploying redundant computa-
tional and communication capacity to recover the services in
case a failure occurs. An example of these strategies applied
for cloud computing resiliency is the PipeCloud approach
proposed in [30], which replicates entire tenant sites to provide
protection.
Protection in distributed systems can be implemented
through replication- and checkpoint-based methodologies [31]:
2.a) Replication is the most common protection method
and consists in the total or partial duplication of capacity
(e.g., data, connections, machines, etc.) to provide protection
in case of failure. The replication can be active or passive.
Active replication keeps many replicas updated (e.g., N -
version programming [32], RAID for disk storage, and 1:N
protection for communication networks [11]). The passive
scheme defines a working component and a dedicated backup
replica where the backup is activated in the case of failure
of the working component to avoid disruption (i.e., recovery
block [33], dedicated-path protection or 1:1 protection, and
shared-path protection [11]).
2.b) Checkpointing consists in periodically saving the sys-
tem state in a different place, and restoring it from there if
the original instance fails. An example of this method is the
dynamic adaptive fault-tolerant strategy [31].
3. Restoration (a.k.a. recovery) refers to reactive and best-
effort schemes to reduce the impact of unexpected failures
after they occur (as opposed to protection where redundant
capacity is pre-deployed). A common recovery strategy for
objects, applications, and components is the retry and reboot
method, which consists in reloading the failed application or
component [34]. A well-known strategy in networks is best-
effort traffic re-routing and capacity re-provisioning to recover
from physical network failures.
B. Metrics for resiliency objectives
The cloud computing resiliency approaches in this survey
use very diverse metrics and objective functions to quantify
and optimize their efficiency to reduce the severity or duration
of cloud service disruption. To provide an overview, we
classify metrics and objective functions based in three main
areas:
1. Survivability is the capability of a system to survive a
certain kind of failures (i.e., single, multiple, and disasters)
and attacks (i.e., WMD and Byzantine) [8] (e.g., recovery point
objective (RPO) [35]).
2. Recovery time (RT) is the duration of the failure recovery
phase, typically used synonymously with mean time to repair
(MTTR). The maximum tolerated RT is the recovery time
objective (RTO), which is listed as part of the service-level
objective (SLO) [35].
3. Cost in resources associated with the resiliency scheme
include CAPEX, OPEX, penalty, and revenue losses.
C. Categorization of surveyed cloud resiliency approaches
Following the service model from Section II-A, we catego-
rize the surveyed approaches in two main groups, discussed
in detail in Sections V and VI, respectively:
1. Resiliency in cloud computing infrastructures contains
a group of approaches designed for cloud infrastructure
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providers (i.e., IaaS and PaaS) that interact with the virtu-
alization and/or physical layer, categorized in five types of
infrastructure: facility, servers, networking, cloud integrated
infrastructure, and cloud middleware.
2. Resiliency in cloud computing applications contains a
group of approaches designed for cloud application containing
providers (i.e., SaaS), especially in interaction with cloud
applications and contents.
V. RESILIENCY TECHNIQUES FOR
CLOUD COMPUTING INFRASTRUCTURE
A cloud infrastructure provider designs, implements, and
operates one or more data centers (i.e., data center facilities)
interconnected by (inter- or intra-data center) communication
facilities. We categorize the resiliency techniques for the cloud
infrastructure in six groups (Fig. 3(c)).
The first two categories (A, B) deal with resiliency inside
the data center (computing) infrastructure, and specifically
with resiliency of facilities (e.g., power, HVAC, etc.; see Sec-
tion V-A) and resiliency of servers (see Section V-B). The next
two categories (C, D) cover the resiliency in inter-data center
communication networks (resiliency of networks, Section V-C)
and resiliency of the integration of the communication network
with the servers (resiliency in cloud integrated infrastructures,
Section V-D). The final groups (E, F) focus on higher-
level components (resiliency of middleware, Section V-E) and
some measurement and estimation techniques for resiliency
(resilient measurement and estimation, Section V-F).
A. Resilient facility design and operation
The primary concern for a cloud computing infrastructure
provider is the resiliency of the data center facility to physical
threats (i.e., disaster, sabotage, terrorist attacks, human errors,
hardware trip, energy blackouts, WMD attacks) and logical
threats (i.e., hackers and cyber terrorism). Figure 4 presents
the elements of a data center facility. Resiliency targets for
data center facilities are classified in tiers, ranging from tier 1
(looser requirements) to tier 4 (stricter requirements) [36]. To
reach a higher tier, the cloud provider must provide resiliency
at the level of the power systems, facility access, and facility
operation, as discussed below.
1. Power resiliency: is the foundation of any cloud facility
given its critical dependency on energy supply.
1.a) Power redundancy: (or “emergency” power) protects
the facility against temporary power outage given the vulner-
ability of the power grid to accidents, weather conditions, and
malicious attacks [37], [38]. Two elements are recommended
to minimize the impact of power outages: uninterruptible
power supply (UPS) and emergency power generation (e.g.,
diesel engine) [18].
1.b) Resiliency against power quality issues: to protect the
facility due to sudden power fluctuations, spikes, or surges,
two elements are highly recommended: the secured power
distribution unit (PDU) and high-voltage DC distribution
(HVDC) [39], [40].
1.c) Resiliency against heat accumulation: redundant and
protected cooling systems to avoid devices from overheating
(e.g., cooling systems) [18], [41].
2. Resilient facility access: techniques that protect cloud
infrastructure facilities from physical and cyber access of
malicious users [25], [42].
3. Resilient facility operation: the implementation of training
and business continuity plans for prevention, detection, miti-
gation, and recovery in case of disasters or attacks [25], [42].
Note that most resiliency techniques for facility design
and operation are designed and tested by a multidisciplinary
set of hardware and facility industries with the support and
standardization of diverse organizations [9], [10], [25], [36],
[42].
However, resiliency techniques for cloud infrastructure in-
troduced in the following sections (V-B through V-F) were
mostly proposed and tested by academia, typically with
support from the information technology (IT) industry (i.e.,
hardware and software industries).
B. Resiliency in servers
Physical servers are essential for computation and storage
in cloud computing infrastructures. Resiliency techniques in
servers are implemented at both the physical and/or the
virtualization layer (Fig. 5).
The surveyed approaches in server resiliency can be di-
vided in two groups: Resiliency in physical servers covering
resiliency techniques for physical servers and storage units;
Resiliency in virtual servers covering resiliency techniques
for virtual machines (VMs) and virtual storage (VS) (see
Glossary in Section VIII). Figure 5 introduces the taxonomy
for resiliency-in-servers techniques, while Table I summarizes
and compares the approaches discussed in this subsection.
1. Resiliency in physical servers: covers a set of failure
removal, protection, and recovery methods acting at different
levels, namely the physical machine (PM) components, the
processes, and the data inside the physical server.
In this regard, the physical-failure isolation or fencing
method provides failure removal in PM components and
processes, while the process-level replication (PLR) method
enforces failure protection and process checkpointing provides
failure recovery in process level [43], [44], [45]. Protection
and recovery of data are enforced by error detection and
correction coding (EDCC) and redundant array of independent
disks (RAID) techniques.
1.a) Failure isolation or fencing: is the isolation of failed
circuits or components in the hardware or process in the
software to avoid failure propagation. An example of fencing
used in multiprocessor architecture is the failure contention
and component retirement in [46].
1.b) Process-level replication (PLR): consists in running
multiple executions of the process on different cores or CPUs
(OS level) [44], and/or in different servers and/or in different
cloud providers [45].
1.c) Process checkpointing: is the re-initialization of a
process, or of a server, or of the entire OS when failures
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Fig. 3. A high-level view of the cloud computing infrastructure provider and taxonomy of resiliency techniques in cloud infrastructure: a) Example of
a cloud computing infrastructure where integration between computing and communication resources is provided; b) The two layers of a cloud computing
infrastructure with building blocks and their association with infrastructure layers in a); c) Taxonomy of resiliency techniques for cloud infrastructures and
their association with layers in b).
Fig. 4. Cloud data center facility, racks, intra-data center network, power
system, and cooling system.
Fig. 5. Taxonomy of resiliency techniques for servers.
or abnormal functions occur. Management tools for cloud
infrastructures use reset/reboot to deal with failed process in
PMs and VMs [47].
1.d) Error detection and correction coding (EDCC): is
a technique used in memories and large storage devices.
For memory (i.e., DRAM), one bit correction and two bits
detection [48] uses a periodic parity check to detect and correct
one bit per byte. For larger storage devices, there are two
common coding techniques: the hamming code (HC) [49] and
the Reed-Solomon (RS) code [50]. A major challenge for
EDCC is the computing capacity required to process a large
volume of data.
1.e) Redundant array of independent disks (RAID): com-
bines EDCC technique with data redundancy to enforce low-
cost active and passive disk replication (i.e., mirroring). RAID
stripes the data in bytes or blocks with single or double
parity EDCC (i.e., single or multiple dedicated parity disk).
The cloud infrastructure provider may install and configure
its storage devices using one or a combination of six types
of RAIDs. A summary and comparison of the various RAID
types can be found in [51].
2. Resiliency in virtual server: includes resiliency methods
based on server virtualization acting on virtual machines (VM)
or on virtualized storage (VS). Virtual server protection is
provided by VM replication in different servers, while VS
recovery is provided by VM migration and VS data coding.
By combining VS protection, recovery and failure removal,
some approaches use VM checkpointing and VM placement
techniques. VS resiliency techniques focus on data recovery
and/or protection, but also include data integrity enforcement
by VS authentication for data integrity control, and VS resilient
architecture design to unify data coding and authentication
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techniques (Table I).
2.a) VM replication: consists in replicating VMs in multiple
PMs to provide resiliency. VM replication must ensure replica-
tion diversity (of PMs and OS environment), synchronization,
and low cost in terms of additional resources. Earlier VM
replication techniques, such as Zap [52], only work among
homogeneous OSs and similar PMs. Later, the approach Au-
toPod [53] was suggested to achieve VM replication between
heterogeneous OSs and PMs. To address the challenge of
replica synchronization, a recent extension of Zap and AutPod,
called fault-tolerant VM (FT-VM) [54] has been proposed that
is able to save up to 10% of the synchronization overhead
compared to baseline replication schemes. VM checkpointing
and VM placement approaches (discussed later) have been
suggested to minimize cost while providing the fast recovery
of VM replication.
2.b) VM migration: consists in the relocation of the entire
VM content from a failed PM to a non-failed PM. This
scheme provides low-cost, yet best-effort recovery [67], [75].
Two approaches to VM migration can be used: pre-copy
and post-copy. Pre-copy migration relocates the full VM
content (i.e., memory and storage) before initiating the users’
reconnection, threfore inducing significant service downtime.
Two such approaches are Xen VM migration (Xen-VM-Mig)
[55] and VMotion [56]. VMotion achieves lower service
downtime compared Xen-VM-Mig, as it does not interrupt
the access to the VM during the migration process. Post-
copy migration techniques gradually replicate the content of
the VM without interrupting the communication from users.
One approach using this technique is PostCLMV [57] which
reduces the migration time by 50% compared to Xen-VM-Mig
and VMotion. However, the service downtime is still high for
large and diverse VMs [67] compared to VM replication, VM
placement, and VM checkpointing (see Table I).
2.c) VM checkpointing: periodically copies the last working
state of the VM in different PMs to provide fast recov-
ery. An early VM checkpointing approach is the internet
suspend/resume (ISR) for VMWare [65]. Two more recent
extensions of ISR for VM replication are Remus [66] and
KEMARI [67]. The main drawbacks of VM checkpointing
are the synchronization overhead and the storage space re-
quired for a larger number of VMs. In this regard, similarity
compression (SC) [76] reduces the storage space by using a
compression algorithm, while fast and capacity-efficient VM
checkpoint (FVMCheck) [68] reduces the storage space and
synchronization overhead using page-caching technique. More
recently, an extension of Remus, RemusDB [69], has been
proposed to reduce synchronization and checkpoint overhead
(see Table I).
2.d) VM placement includes those techniques that try to
obtain a resilient allocation of VMs in the cloud infrastructure
by intelligent placement [77]. We surveyed three resilient
VM placement techniques: pre-migration, clustering of VM
replicas, and resilient VM allocation. The pre-migration tech-
nique consists in predefining a migration location for a VM
in case of PM failure, by reserving an empty VM ready
to receive an emergency evacuation of the working VM.
This technique reduces the migration time of baseline VM
migration techniques, however the determination of the point
for migration is challenging. The proactive-fault tolerance (P-
FT) approach in [58] uses a failure-prediction technique based
on the failure history of each server. Significant reduction of
downtime during migration is achieved by re-configurable dis-
tributed virtual machines (RDVM) [59], [78]. Multiple server
failures are addressed by high available VM placement (HA-
VM-Place) [62] and VM shadow-based placement solution
(VM-SBS-Place) [63]. Another important aspect in the resilient
VM placement problem relates to clustering. In fact, clustering
of VM replicas allows to distribute VMs in different PMs to
avoid single point of failures. Approaches using this technique
are structural constraint aware VM placement (SCVP) [60] for
single-server failures, and high available logical encapsulation
(HA-LOC) [64] for multiple server failures. Finally, resilient
VM placement can be also achieved based on the specific (and
diverse) resiliency demands of each application, as in adaptive
fault tolerance in real-time cloud computing (AFTRC) [61],
developed to minimize downtime (i.e., recovery time (RT)) of
real-time applications.
2.e) VS data coding: consists in the use of data coding
techniques for recovering data of virtualized storage (VS)
in case of physical failures or Byzantine attacks. For data
recovery in case of server failures, a scalable Reed-Solomon
(SRS) approach is suggested in [70] to reduce the processing
time, storage space, and bandwidth required by the canonical
Reed-Solomon (RS) technique [50]. However, as Byzantine
attacks might corrupt the data coded by SRS, a Byzantine
coding (Byzant-Code) technique is suggested in [71] to defend
data from such attacks (see Glossary in Section VIII).
2.f) VS data authentication: ensures data consistency to
prevent data losses and anomalies during failures or Byzantine
attacks into VSs (e.g., proofs of writing (PoWerStore) protocol
suggested in [72]).
2.g) VS resilient architecture designs: suggest the addition
of a specialized layer into the VS or cloud storage system
to enforce resiliency. Two proposals for VS design are high-
availability and integrity layer (HAIL) [73] and cloud storage
with minimal trust (Depot) [74]. HAIL adds a layer with a
proof-of-retrievability (POR) module in each server to mitigate
data losses due to server failures or Byzantine attacks (see
Glossary in Section VIII). Depot proposes a two-layer VS
architecture, where the first layer enforces data replication,
while the second layer implements protocols for data consis-
tency and recovery functionalities (e.g., PowerStore, Byzant-
Code). Table I confirms the ability of the approaches in this
category to combine the benefits of coding and authentication
techniques.
Discussion of benefits and challenges for resiliency tech-
niques in servers: Table I presents the key benefits and
challenges of resiliency in servers with a brief comparison
of the levels of survivability achieved. The most important
benefits are the high redundancy, low cost (e.g., VM mi-
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gration approaches), and low recovery time (RT) (e.g., VM
checkpointing). The main challenges derive from large service
diversity in cloud computing, large run-time complexity, and
large volume of data or content placed in the infrastructure.
As a result, some resiliency techniques face problems of
high computational complexity (e.g., multiple VM placement
problem, multiple VM checkpointing synchronization, and
high data coding overhead in VS servers) that require efficient
optimization tools or further studies. Indeed, in terms of
resilient planning and management, techniques for resiliency
in servers are designed to support resiliency planning (i.e.,
PLA) and to be integrated with management tools for run-
time or operational resiliency (i.e., P/R, RUN). However, they
depend on the network availability and an efficient resource
allocation to deal with cloud infrastructure complexity. Hence,
techniques for resiliency in servers are integrated with oth-
ers techniques to deal with cloud infrastructure resiliency
(Sections V-C, V-D, V-E and, V-F). Before we advance, we
will discuss techniques for resiliency in networks which are
essential for the integration of techniques for resiliency in
cloud infrastructure.
C. Resiliency in networks
The resiliency of the communication network is essential
for cloud infrastructures that are typically geo-distributed.
The network infrastructures used by cloud providers are two:
the intra-data center network (Intra-DCN) using a local-area
network (LAN) technology inside a data center facility, and
the inter-data center network (Inter-DCN) using wide-area
network (WAN) technologies (e.g., optical networks) inter-
connecting two or more data centers into a federated cloud.
Besides the design and operation of their own data center
facilities, cloud providers might use communication services
from carriers and/or Internet services providers (e.g., AT&T)
and/or manage their own large network communication (i.e.,
WAN) infrastructure (e.g., Google). On top of such large
communication networks, network virtualization is enabled to
enforce multi-tenancy, geo-distribution, and resource pooling
as discussed in Section II-B.
Two surveys [11], [115] have presented and classified
important studies on communication network resiliency. A
survey about disasters and their effects in optical networks
is presented in [12]. However, virtual network environments
tends to be particularly prone to failure disruptions as the
failure in one single physical element (i.e., an optical link)
might disconnect a large set of virtual connections from
different tenants and cloud applications. Some techniques for
virtual-network resiliency (e.g., survivability of virtual net-
work embedding (SVNE)) were surveyed in [116]. Here, we
extend and complement the existing overviews with a specific
focus on the resiliency techniques for data center networks
and virtualized networks that are relevant from the perspective
of a cloud provider. Figure 6 introduces the taxonomy of
resiliency techniques, and Table II presents our categorization
for network resiliency in cloud infrastructure.
1. Resiliency in data center networks: includes techniques for
Fig. 6. Network resiliency taxonomy.
resilient design and traffic engineering for intra-data center
networks (Intra-DCN) and their extension for the inter-data
center network (Inter-DCN). When techniques are applicable
to both inter- and intra-DCN scenario, we simply use the term
DCN.
1.a) Intra-DCN reliable design: should complete four im-
portant requisites to increase the network resiliency: high nodal
degree, existence of backup routes, large critical cuts (see
Glossary in Section VIII), and high capacity for redundancy
(i.e., for protection and restoration). Three design strategies
were suggested for meeting these requirements:
Switch redundancy consists in the addition of backup top-
of-rack (ToR) and/or aggregation (Agg) and/or core switches
in Intra-DCNs [117]. Some well-known architectures enabling
this scheme are: FatTree [79], VL2 [80], and Qfabric [81].
The Qfabric architecture provides the highest survivability,
but with highest cost, while less-costly but less-resilient Intra-
DCN architecture are shown in Table II. Figure 7(a) shows an
example of the FatTree scheme.
Fig. 7. Examples and comparison of network-centric vs. server-centric intra-
DCN architectures [86], [87]. a) Network-centric example: FatTree, where a
double switch failure disconnects 1/4 of the PMs. b) Server-centric example:
BCube, where a double switch failure does not disconnect PMs. Note that even
the failure of a third switch will only disconnect one PM. c) A scalable and
server-centric example: SWDC Torus 2D, is the most resilient architecture
in this figure, as even four (or more) switch failures do not disconnect the
remaining network.
Server port redundancy design adds network connections
and routing options in the servers (server-centric architectures)
[117]. Some server-centric architectures enabling high port
redundancy are DCell [82], BCube [83], FiComm [84], DPillar
[85], small-world data center (SWDC) [86], and Scafida [87].
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Figures 7(b) and 7(c) present examples of two server-centric
architectures (SWDC and BCube) that protect against multiple
failures in servers and switches (SWDC is the most resilient
proposal) (Table II).
Topology augmentation design technique is the assisted ad-
dition of network links and/or nodes to improve the resiliency
of Intra-DCN architectures. One approach using this technique
is the full-fledged DC architecture (FScafida) [88] to guide
topology augmentation in the Scafida architecture [87].
1.b) Intra-DCN traffic protection: consists in the distribu-
tion of traffic and/or replication of routes for case of link
and/or node failures.
Traffic distribution: consists in the traffic splitting, distri-
bution, routing, and load balancing through different nodes
and links to avoid losses due to failures. One such approach
for redundant switch architectures (i.e., Fattree and VL2) is the
high-availability and full bandwidth communication (HADCN)
suggested in [89]. The main advantage of this approach is
the adaptability and the small additional capacity required to
provide resiliency (Table II).
Route replication: consists in the use of multiple routes
(i.e., k-shortest paths) to provide protection up to k-1 links
and/or node failures. An approach using this technique is
the BCube source routing protocol (BSR) proposed in [83],
however the main challenge of this approach is the high
overhead produced in the addition of a new requested route.
To deal with this weakness, effective source routing (ESR)
is suggested in [88] to decrease the cost of route replication
compared to BSR (see Table II).
1.c) Inter-DCN traffic protection: consists in the pre-
provisioning of redundant capacity to protect network traffic
in case of failure. The topic of protection in generic com-
munication (transport) networks has been largely investigated
(see, e.g., [118], [119]). In summary, three types of approaches
using this strategy are as follows:
Pre-configured path: techniques that pre-provision backup
paths to protect traffic on the network. Two types of pre-
configured approaches are used in inter-DCN; dedicated
backup path protection (DBPP) [90], which requires a ded-
icated backup for each working path; shared backup path
protection (SBPP) [91], which allows sharing of backup paths
between different working paths. Both approaches offer full
protection for each working path against link and node failures.
DBPP requires more cost in resources compared to SBPP,
however DBPP might provide high resiliency for case of
multiple failures.
Pre-configured graph: consists in pre-provisioning of re-
dundant capacity using graph topologies. Some approaches
enabling this techniques are pre-configured tree (p-Tree) [94]
based on tree graphs, pre-configured cycles (p-Cycle) [92]
based on cycle graphs, and pre-configured prism (p-Prism)
[95] based on prism graphs. p-Cycle can be combined with
pre-configured path (i.e., FIPP-p-Cycle and flow p-Cycle) [92],
[93]. Figure 8 shows an example of FIPP-p-Cycles scheme
used in a large and distributed cloud infrastructure (i.e., Inter-
DCN) protecting traffic and connections from a double failure
in the core or transmission network.
Failure-aware provisioning: consists in avoiding potential
failures using some predictions (i.e., probability of disaster
occurrence) to reduce the risk of cloud service disruptions.
Risk-aware provisioning techniques for protection and recov-
ery routes and paths in multiple link and node failures caused
by a disaster is disaster resilient risk aware (DR-Risk), as
suggested in [96], [97].
1.d) DCN traffic recovery: consists in fast traffic re-routing
in case of failure in network components. One approach
enabling traffic re-routing on each intermediate node or server
in case of Intra-DCN failures is traffic-aware routing (TAR)
[84]. A similar approach for the DCell architecture is the DCell
fault-tolerance routing (DFR) [82]. Both approaches work on
a best-effort basis, hence re-routing in case of multiple failures
or disaster can be challenging (Table II). Various approaches
for inter-DCN traffic recovery are surveyed in [118].
Note that some approaches for Intra-DCN reliable design
were proposed by network hardware industry (e.g., Qfab-
ric from Juniper) to address the requirement for redundant
ports and specialized switches. The remaining approaches are
mostly proposed by academia.
Fig. 8. Example of a p-Cycle. a) FIPP p-Cycle (dotted line) used to protect
two working paths. b) Example of double failures and the use of p-Cycle for
recovery.
2. Resiliency in virtualized networks
We classify three approaches to network virtualization:
virtual optical network (VON), virtual private network (VPN),
and software-defined network (SDN). VON uses hardware-
level virtualization (Fig. 9) where the mapping of each virtual
link uses optical channels, while VPN and SDN are based
on software-level virtualization. VPN is a type of VN created
by the generalized multiprotocol label switching (GMPLS) or
tunneling protocols [120]. SDN introduces programmability
and independence between control and data planes [121],
[122].
The major challenge of resiliency in virtualized networks is
that a single physical failure might disconnect and affect many
virtual networks. To deal with this problem, survivable virtual
network embedding (SVNE) approaches were suggested in
[116], [123]. Figure 9 shows an example of the SVNE problem
and some techniques to deal with failures.
Surveyed approaches for resiliency in virtualized networks
follow the classification in Fig. 6 and are summarized in
Table II. Note that these approaches can be either proactive
(redundant capacity assignment happens before the failure)
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Fig. 9. Example of SVNE problem and two suggested techniques. a-b) Two
virtual networks VN 1 = [1-2, 2-3, 1-3] (virtual links I, II, and III) and VN 2
= [5-4] (virtual link IV) connecting tenants in a federated cloud comprising
three data centers [DC 1, DC 2, and DC 3]. The virtual topology of VN 1
has three cuts while the virtual topology of VN 2 has one cut. c) Example
of non-survivable mapping of both VNs using one end-to-end optical channel
(lightpath) per virtual link. Any failure in one or in a combination of the optical
links [A-B, A-E, E-H, H-J] will disconnect VN 1 and VN 2 because one or
more cuts share the same optical links (e.g., both cuts 3 and 4 are disconnected
if physical link A-E fails). d) Survivable (i.e., cut-disjoint) mapping, where
no single link failure disconnects VN 1 (VN 2 cannot be protected, as it it
composed by a single virtual link). e) Topology augmentation technique where
an additional backup virtual link is mapped for each non-survivable VN to
increase their resiliency.
or reactive (backup capacity is provisioned after the failure).
Most techniques provide resiliency in single-link or single-
node failure scenarios except resilient cut-disjoint, cross-layer
backup, and SDN resiliency techniques, which provide higher
resiliency in case of multiple nodes or disaster failures.
2.a) Survivable VN mapping: consists in provisioning ca-
pacity for the mapping of a virtual network over a physical
network in such a way that a failure (or a set of failures) at
the physical layer do not disconnect the virtual network. We
classify three types of approaches for survivable VN mapping:
topology cut avoidance, virtual topology augmentation, and
traffic disruption avoidance (see Table II).
Topology cut avoidance: consists in performing VN map-
ping by avoiding that virtual links belonging to the same cut
in the virtual topology are mapped on the same physical link
(otherwise the failure would disconnect the virtual network).
One of the earliest proposals of cut-disjoint mapping for
survivable virtual optical network (VON) mapping in IP-over-
WDM networks is an extension of the routing and wavelength
assignment (RWA) called RWA-cut-disjoint [98], [99]. Cut-
disjoint mapping technique offers a more scalable resiliency
compared to path-disjoint approaches introduced in other stud-
ies such as [124]. Given that RWA-cut-disjoint enforces near-
full VON survivability against single-physical-link failures and
a best-effort resiliency for dual-link failures, the survivable
virtual topology routing (SVTR) is also suggested in [100]
to deal with larger failures (i.e., a group of links and/or
nodes which might fail together, a so-called shared-risk group
(SRG)). An example of cut-disjoint mapping is presented in
Fig. 9(d).
Virtual topology augmentation: requires the addition of
virtual links and/or nodes to protect or recover possible
failures. One of the earliest VN mapping approaches using this
technique is virtual network topology augmentation for surviv-
able VON mapping (aug-SVON-mapping) [101] where a non-
survivable VON mapping is augmented to become survivable.
Aug-SVON-mapping identifies if cuts of the VN topology can
be disconnected by a single-link failure and then adds a virtual
link in order to avoid the disconnection. Multiple augmenta-
tions can provide protection or recovery against multiple link
failures. The design-dimensioning survivable virtual topology
(des-dim-SVT) approach in [102] reduces considerably the
RT and allows multiple topology augmentation for one and
multiple VNs or multi-tenants VNs, which is key for cloud
infrastructure providers. An example of a single-link topology
augmentation is presented in Fig. 9(e) where one virtual link is
mapped in addition to each VN to convert the non-survivable
VN mapping of Fig. 9(c) into a survivable VN.
Traffic disruption avoidance: consists in mapping the VN
to avoid specific routes and/or traffic disruptions that can
be know a priori. Two such approaches are ext-aug-SVON
[103] that uses failure-aware routing in the topology aug-
mentation scheme, and routing-allocation-SVON in [104] that
also attempts to limit congestion while performing failure-
aware routing. Ext-aug-SVON also provides post-failure fast-
recovery capabilities, similar to the recovery schemes dis-
cussed previously. In the case of routing-allocation-SVON, the
routing of IP-level and optical-level paths are jointly optimized
to minimize the required capacity. Hence, routing-allocation-
SVON provides higher cost-efficiency, while ext-aug-SVON
might provide higher resiliency as it might recover from a
larger number of failures.
2.b) Cross-layer VN protection: groups the approaches
where protection (or restoration) of the virtual networks is
provided through a cross-layer design of backup capacity at
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the physical and logical (virtual) network levels. We subdivide
this into two categories, one focusing on using physical-layer
backup capacity sharing, and the other focusing on two-layer
backup paths optimization (Table II).
Physical-layer backup sharing: focuses on the effective use
of backup capacity in the physical network. The cross-layer
survivable virtual network embedding (CL-SVNE) proposed
in [105] is a hybrid approach that provides both proactive
and reactive survivable VN mapping by combining two-link
physical protection and VN mapping. However, CL-SVNE
might require a large amount of backup capacity in the
physical layer. Hence, backup capacity sharing between VNs
can be enabled using the shared backup network provision for
SVN (SBPSV) in [106] or SBPSV for SVON (SBPSVO) in [107]
to provide a more capacity-efficient survivable VN mapping.
Two-layer backup optimization: consists in the interchange
of backup resources between the physical network and the
virtual network. This technique extends the previous cross-
layer protection schemes to provide resiliency in case of larger
failures (i.e., SRG and disasters). One such approach is the
inter-layer shared backup path (SPGC) in [108] that exploits
a two-layer shared backup pool (similar to a generalization
of the common pool technique in MPLS networks), where
the shared backup pool comprises either standby virtual or
physical links that can be used to recover different kinds of
failures.
2.c) Service-oriented VN recovery: consists in performing
VN recovery while explicitly accounting for service-level ob-
jectives (SLO) that can be different for different tenants. One
service-oriented VM recovery approach is QoS-VNmap [109]
that uses SLO requirements to allocate the backup capacity
needed to meet the specific RT of each cloud application. A
similar approach is overlay VN mapping (OVN) in [110]. Since
OVN is not scalable for large multi-tenant cloud infrastructure,
the heuristic overlay VN mapping (HOVN) approach in [111]
has also been proposed to add scalability while preserving the
SLO targets and quasi-optimality of the results. Finally, for the
specific case of MPLS VPN services (which reserve capacity
in each router or switch based on QoS requirements), the
approach VN configurable survivability (VPCS) is proposed
in [112] to add traffic forwarding intelligence in each router
and enable adaptable protection and recovery for the cases of
node or link failures.
2.d) Resiliency for software-defined networks (SDN). To
enable virtual networks, the interaction between data plane
and control plane is key for resiliency. Some studies propose
to adopt software-defined networking (SDN) to deal with
this problem [121]. Resiliency in SDN networks requires
replication of the centralized controller and careful placement
of these replicas. The CP Recovery approach in [113] pro-
poses a scheme for the physical replication of the logically-
centralized controller while minimizing RT. SDN-DR-WAN in
[114] extends the replication scheme in [113] by adding a
disaster-resilient placement of multiple controllers in a large
network. Experimental results confirm the applicability of
SDN-DR-WAN for disaster recovery (see Table II).
Discussion of benefits and challenges for resiliency tech-
niques in networks: Table II presents key benefits and chal-
lenges of resiliency in networks. Some benefits for cloud
infrastructure resiliency are: (i) High redundancy provided by
techniques for Intra-DCN design; (ii) Low cost by techniques
for cross-layer protection and survivable VN mapping because
they allow cooperative resource allocation between physical
and virtualized networks; (iii) Low recovery times (RT) pro-
vided by reserving additional capacity (i.e., Inter-DCN protec-
tion techniques), and delay is minimized by service-oriented
VN recovery; (iv) Flexibility and multi-tenancy capabilities
are obtained by resiliency techniques for network virtualiza-
tion. However, resiliency techniques in networks face similar
challenges of the resiliency techniques in servers, especially
in terms of complexity and the necessity of integration with
other techniques to provide resiliency in cloud infrastructure.
The mentioned challenges are discussed in following Sections
V-D, V-E, and V-F).
Fig. 10. Cloud integrated infrastructure taxonomy.
D. Resiliency in cloud integrated infrastructure
Cloud providers connect computation and communication
elements in an integrated infrastructure to offer their services
to tenants and customers. This integration results in a so-
called Cloud Oriented Federated Computing and Networking
System (CFCNS) [157]. Then, cloud functionalities (as seen
in Section II-B) are enabled by virtualizing the CFCNS infras-
tructure, i.e., slicing the CFNS resource, thanks to virtualized
servers (i.e., VMs and VSs) that are accessed using virtualized
networks (i.e., VN, VON, and SDN). In the following, we will
call the integration of virtual servers and virtual networks as a
Cloud Network (CN) [155], i.e., the CN is a virtualized slice
of the CFCNS infrastructure (see Glossary in Section VIII). In
such an integrated system, failures in network elements as well
as in servers might induce failure cascades that affect other
elements of the CFCNS, given their strict interdependence. So,
resiliency techniques specifically designed for communication
network or server systems in isolation can be insufficient to
ensure the resiliency of a CFCNS. An efficient coordination
and integration of these resiliency approaches is necessary.
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In continuation to the previous classifications, we categorize
approaches for CFCNS resiliency as those related to: (i)
the physical layer or (ii) the virtualization layer. Surveyed
approaches for resiliency in cloud integrated infrastructures
are organized according to the classification in Fig. 10, while
Table III introduces a taxonomy of the approaches, followed
by a brief description of each approach and technique.
1. Resiliency in CFCNS infrastructures: covers those ap-
proaches for protection and recovery of content, routes, and
DCs that apply in the case of failures affecting the CFCNS
(i.e., not addressing the specific issue of virtualization as the
next category). The four main techniques are:
1.a) Reliable placement: which consists in performing, dur-
ing the design phase, reliable placement of DCs (or VMs)
and reliable choice of routes in a CFCNS infrastructure. Two
surveyed approaches fall in this category: analytic hierarchy
process (AHP) in [125] selects the most survivable placement
for the nodes and links of the inter-DCN network topology
based on the vulnerability of physical links (i.e., vulnerability
aware (VA)); the disaster resiliency data center and content
placement (DRDCP) in [126], [127] minimizes the risk of
damage produced by a disaster (i.e., natural disasters and
WMD attacks) on cloud facilities and contents.
1.b) Reliable capacity dimensioning: adapts and organizes
the capacity of CFCSN to avoid failures. Existing approaches
for capacity dimensioning typically rely on anycast routing and
resource degradation. Anycast routing can be used to discover
the minimum-cost connectivity between all possible pairs of
DCs or contents. Resource degradation is a temporary reduc-
tion of the server or bandwidth capacity enforced to distribute
surviving resources to all customers. Three approaches using
one or both these techniques are: routing aware placement
(R-Aware) [128], failure independent rerouting (FID) [130],
[131], and degradation-aware provisioning disaster recovery
(DAP) [129]. The three approaches minimize cost and RT by
using: connection relocation (in FID), two types of routing
protection (in R-Aware), and two types of backup routing with
gradual degradation in case of multiple failures (in DAP).
An extension of DAP for gradual capacity degradation to
recover connections after a disaster is suggested in [158].
Disaster resilient data center dimensioning (DRDD) in [132]
also adds content replication and placement in the capacity
dimensioning.
1.c) Content evacuation for recovery. In presence of pre-
dictable failures (e.g., an upcoming hurricane), an alert is
typically issued and the cloud provider might have time to
“evacuate” data from the data center locations under risk
towards other safe data center facilities. Two approaches
implementing this concept are disaster backup in multi-data
center (DB-multi-DC) [133] and rapid data-evacuation strat-
egy (DR-RAPID-EVA) [134]. DB-multi-DC uses a two-step
algorithm to solve the fast-backup evacuation of data center
contents. DR-RAPID-EVA exploits the time made available
by the disaster alert and the extent of the forecast damage as
input to run a fast reactive evacuation algorithm, especially
tailored for large failures such as disasters or Electromagnetic
Pulse (EMP) attacks.
1.d) Failure detection and mitigation: consists in a set of
resiliency techniques that support failure detection, mitigation,
and recovery in cloud infrastructure. A well-known approach is
the automatic data center network failure mitigation (NetPilot)
in [24] that implements failure detection by inferring device
anomalies, then disables the failed components, and migrates
cloud services to failure-free components until the failed
component is repaired or replaced. A similar approach, Fail-
ure managed by integrated unsupervised and semi-supervised
learning (PFMLearning) [135] introduces a failure-detection
approach that uses Bayesian classifiers to detect and classify
anomalous behaviors (i.e., possible software and hardware
failures), followed by an application of learning decision trees
to process such anomalies and possibly to predict incoming
failures in large cloud infrastructures. This approach combines
measurement and estimation technique (Section V-F) with run-
time failure mitigation.
2. Resiliency in cloud networks: covers the resiliency ap-
proaches working at the virtualization layer, i.e., approaches
exploiting the concepts of virtual servers, virtual networks
(and their integration), and the cloud network (CN). Various
techniques, comprising the virtual backup node (VBN), VM
migration, VM replication, CN mapping, anycast routing, and
backup sharing are overviewed in this section. Figure 11
presents an example of a CFCSN architecture supporting a
CN comprising VNs and VMs (see Glossary in Section VIII).
Fig. 11. Three layers of a CFCSN architecture and its components at each
layer. A generalized CN is instantiated on top of the CFCNS infrastructure
based on two fat-tree intra-DCNs. This generic example is applicable to any
of the discussed resilient architectures: VICTOR, SecondNet, CloudNaaS, and
VENICE. A replicated centralized controller is also supported.
2.a) Resilient CN architectures: contain a set of studies
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proposing functionalities to support resilient CN design. A
survey of CN architecture is presented in [136], with pro-
posals for resilient CN mapping and design. Most surveyed
approaches rely on combinations of the following families
of functionalities: (i) central controller replication (CR),
(ii) redundant (bandwidth and processing) capacity dimen-
sioning, (iii) IP and/or applications address mobility (AM),
(iv) VM survivability functionalities (VM survivavility) (e.g.,
VM migration, VM replication, and VM placement), (v) VN
survivability strategies (VN survivaviliy) (e.g., pre-configured
backup paths, cut-disjoint mapping, anycast routing, etc.). As
shown in Table III, [136] surveyed five main proposals in this
category: VICTOR, VENICE [146], and Oktopus (network-
centric Intra-DCN architectures), CloudNaaS, and SecondNet
(server-centric architectures). Figure 11 illustrates a generic
example of a CN mapped over a CFCNS infrastructure,
applicable to all the previous five approaches. Another earlier
CN implementation is the virtual inter-networking on overlay
infrastructure (VIOLIN) suggested in [159].
2.b) Virtual backup node for CN resiliency: consists in the
utilization of an external virtual backup node (VBN) to be
placed in an additional node or DC to provide CN protection
and recovery in case of failure of one of the original VN
nodes. Each backup facility node is connected with additional
virtual links and provides reserved capacity to replicate and
migrate VMs in case of failures. Application of the VBN
technique requires effective selection and/or placement of the
VBN. Two types of VBN placement strategies were suggested:
(i) failure independent, as in l-Backup-Node and K-Backup
Node [137] and location constrained survivable network em-
bedding (LSNE) [138]; and (ii) failure dependent, as in failure-
dependent backup node approach (FD-K-Backup-Node) [139],
[137], and survivable virtual infrastructure mapping for re-
gional failure in FCNS infrastructure (RSVIM-Bnode) [140].
l-Backup-Node consists in the mapping of one VBN per CN
while k-Backup-Node consists in the mapping of one VBN
for each virtual node. LSNE is similar to K-Backup-Node,
while FD-K-Backup-Node and RSVIN-Bnode map the VBN
based on the level of resiliency required. RSVIN-Bnode’s main
goal is to map CNs protected from disaster failure. Figure
12 introduces an example of a CN using VBN technique.
The VBN technique is also often used in combination with
other techniques such as VM replication, VM placement, and
VM checkpoint techniques (that we have introduced before).
VBN with VM replication approaches are survivable virtual
infrastructure with active VM replication (SVI-Active-VM-Rep)
[141] and a greedy randomized adaptive VM replication (VN-
GRASP) [142]. VBN with VM checkpoint is suggested in
VNsnap by [143]. SVI-Active-VM-Rep divides the problem in
two sub-problems, VM placement and survivable virtual link
mapping, and solves both using a heuristic algorithm which
minimizes the reserved bandwidth. VM-GRASP optimizes
resource allocation including the future connectivity demands,
and requires less resources compared to SVI-Active-VM-
Rep. VNsnap stores snapshots of the entire CN, including
processing, storage, and communication states, which can then
be recovered in selected backup facility nodes. VNsnap is
more cost-efficient compared to VM-GRASP and SVI-Active-
VM-Rep (Table III).
Fig. 12. Example of CN resiliency using the Virtual Backup Node. The
CN connects three VMs using a VN. The virtual backup node is instantiated
using VM migration in case of failure.
2.c) Resilient routing with replicated VMs: uses anycast
routing towards replicated VMs to minimize delay, cost,
and resources required. Survivable CN with anycast (SCN-
AnyCast) [144] minimizes delay and/or cost in CN mapping
with replicated VMs in case of DC and link failures. However,
the synchronization between VM replicas requires additional
mapping, hence [145], [160] propose an extension of SCN-
AnyCast, called (SCN-Joint-AnyCast-Rep), that performs joint
optimization of synchronization bandwidth while minimizing
RT. A more comprehensive and cost-efficient approach using
anycast routing with VM replication is the reliability-aware
VDC embeding (RA-VDC-Emb) approach [146] that maps,
replicates, and migrates VMs in case of server or commu-
nication failures.
2.d) Resilient CN mapping with resource sharing tech-
niques: consists in the sharing of facility nodes (i.e., server
and/or DC), and/or link capacity as pool of resources (i.e.,
resource pooling) between different CNs to provide resiliency.
Approaches using sharing provide cost-efficient protection and
recovery. Local protection for resilient VI mapping (LP-RVIM)
[147] is a node/link sharing approach that uses a node and
links already mapped by existing CNs as virtual backup nodes
for new incoming CN requests. Resource pooling is enabled
also in virtual infrastructure mapping with opportunistic re-
source pooling (SVI-ORP) [148] to enforce resiliency with “k-
redundant shared resources” placed in strategic locations. SVI-
ORP extends the concept of SBPSV [106] for CN resiliency.
However, resource pooling can produce resource fragmenta-
tion which is very difficult to optimize in large and multi-
domain cloud infrastructure. Survivable virtual infrastructure
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with resource optimization (SVI-REOP) in [149] uses an auxil-
iary graph transformation to minimize resource fragmentation.
2.e) Disaster resilient CN mapping covers a set of ap-
proaches combining and extending the previously-discussed
resiliency techniques to provide protection and recovery in
case of disaster failures. Note that, in disaster scenarios, the
initial failures directly caused by the disaster are usually
followed by correlated and cascaded post-disaster failures
(due to, e.g., aftershocks, or power shortage due to battery
exhaustion). Different approaches for different types of disas-
ter failures are summarized in Table III. The first approach
introduced in Table III is the regional failure-independent
resilient mapping (FD-RRVIM) [150] that extends RSVIM-
Bnode by adding VM checkpointing, replication, and migra-
tion into VBN technique to provide an adaptive, cost-efficient,
and fast CN recovery in case of a disaster. However, VBN
requires additional cost for CN mapping which might not
be sustainable, especially in a multi-tenant and multi-domain
cloud environment. Hence, disaster survivable anycast (DS-
AnyCast-BNode) [151] uses anycast routing to reduce the
capacity required to connect and place VBN and VM replicas.
A similar approach, disaster resilient mapping with content
connectivity (RVN-DR-Content) [152], maps CNs to provide
disaster-resilient content placement without using a specific
backup node to reduce cost and complexity.
In [152], the concept of network connectivity (ensuring
reachability among all nodes of the CN) is evolved to content
connectivity (ensuring reachability of content replica, even if
the CN is disconnected) for the case of disaster failures. Two
other approaches, failure region disjoint mapping (FRGBM)
[153] and dynamic failure region disjoint mapping (DFRDM)
[154], use disaster-aware (i.e., disaster-disjoint) mapping to
add backup virtual links where failures may occur under the
objective of minimizing the overall cost (Table III). Most of
the surveyed approaches use the a priori knowledge of disaster
probability (determined using hazard maps [97]) to map a CN
by avoiding disaster-prone areas. Nonetheless, most disaster-
resilient CN mapping schemes do not consider post-disaster
correlated and cascading failures. Disaster resilient mapping
with post-disaster survivability (DRM-PDS) [155], [156] adds
post-disaster-risk awareness into VBM and cut-disjoint routing
to minimize the risk of CN disconnection and capacity losses
caused by post-disaster cascading failures. Figure 12 shows
an example of disaster-resilient CN mapping using VBN and
VM migration.
Finally, two disaster-recovery approaches applying a com-
plete replica of entire cloud sites are cloud based disaster
recovery (PipeCloud) [30] and disaster tolerance SecondSite
[21]. PipeCloud replicates and synchronizes entire cloud sites
or cluster of VMs of multiple CNs through large cloud
computing infrastructure to create recovery capability, while
SecondSite detects and recovers cloud sites in multi-domain
clouds affected by a disaster (see Table III).
Discussion of benefits and challenges of resiliency tech-
niques in cloud integrated infrastructure: Table III compares
approaches on resiliency in cloud infrastructures and discusses
some benefits and challenges. The main benefits for cloud
infrastructure designer and providers are: (i) integration of
server and network resiliency planning and operation; (ii)
virtualization, which adds cost efficiency and flexibility in
multi-domain clouds; (iii) comprehensive failure and damage
estimation tools based on risk assessment (e.g., R-Aware,
DRDD, DRM-PDS), machine learning, and probabilistic tools
(e.g., Net-Pilot, PFMLearning); and (iv) resiliency planning
(i.e., PLA) and operation (i.e., RUN) in large and com-
plex failure scenarios (e.g., disaster and cascading failures).
However, due to the inherent complexity of multi-layer and
multi-domain planning, operation, and optimization in cloud
computing, the integration of multiple resiliency techniques
adds several research and optimization challenges. Some op-
timization challenges are how to choose and manage a cost-
efficient set of integrated resiliency techniques or architectures
while reducing cloud service disruptions and maintaining a
tenant’s SLO. In Sections V-E and V-F, we categorize some
complementary resiliency techniques dealing with some of the
aforementioned challenges.
Fig. 13. Taxonomy of resiliency techniques for cloud middleware infrastruc-
ture.
E. Resiliency in cloud middleware infrastructure
Middleware is a sublayer implementing key functionalities
of the virtualization layer in cloud oriented federated com-
puting and networking systems (CFCNS) infrastructure. Its
architecture has been analyzed in [188], where the importance
of middleware resiliency for cloud systems was also empha-
sized. Resiliency approaches for middleware are manifold:
checkpoint management, resilient connectivity on top of vir-
tualized components, resilient load balancing and scheduling
among virtualized components, and self-adaptable middleware
architecture design. Figure 13 introduces the categories for
middleware resiliency, and Table IV summarizes the studies
on middleware resiliency surveyed in this subsection.
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1. Middleware checkpoint management: As seen for VM
resilient operation, middleware process resiliency can also
be enhanced using checkpointing. The problem to obtain
optimal scheduling for checkpoint of multiple components
and layers is complex (proven to be NP-hard in [189]),
because checkpoint implementation might differ based on the
component diversity. This is particularly challenging in large
cloud infrastructures due to synchronization, upgrade, and
resource management issues. In the following, three resilient
checkpoint-management techniques are surveyed:
1.a) Checkpoint management for big data: consists in the
optimal synchronization of multiple checkpoints to protect and
recover big data sets. Some approaches using this technique
are the fault-tolerant high performance cloud strategy (FT-
HPC) [161] and retrying failure recovery technique (RFTT)
[162]. FT-HPC reduces the interference between checkpoint
data and minimizes RT of big data scientific cloud applica-
tions. RFTT combines a cloud management system (CMS)
with scheduling techniques to recover failed virtual sites. Ef-
fective scheduling allows RFTT to work for a large number of
services with lower overhead compared to FT-HPC (Table IV).
1.b) Checkpoint management for adaptable applications:
consists in the use of adaptive synchronization techniques for
checkpointing of data for recovery. In short, the synchroniza-
tion technique is adaptive to the application characteristics
and resiliency demands. An approach using this technique
is checkpointing orchestration (CO) suggested in [163] that
minimizes the I/O contention of concurrent checkpoint data
from distributed and large cloud infrastructure. Another ap-
proach is the dynamic adaptive fault tolerance (DAFT) [31]
that adaptively coordinates checkpoints and service (i.e., data,
connections, and applications) replication to satisfy SLOs.
1.c) Checkpoint management in virtualization: combines
the checkpointing technique with load balancing and virtu-
alization. Virtualization and fault tolerance (VFT) in [164]
reduces the recovery overhead in two steps: virtualization and
load balancing, and replication of virtualized process, using
checkpointing. To reduce the overhead, during the recovery
process, VFT uses a cloud manager (CM) and a decision
maker (DM) module which detect and block failed PM and
software components. Another approach is BlobCR: efficient
checkpoint-restart for HPC applications in [165] that check-
points hard disks of each server and reduces the RT compared
to previous baseline VM checkpoint approaches.
2. Resilient middleware connectivity: extends middleware
communication protocols (i.e., TCP/IP) to enhance resiliency
of cloud services and applications. Middleware connections
are typically set to connect virtual middleware processes using
TCP/IP and/or SDN protocols (e.g., OpenFlow) (Table IV).
2.a) TCP/IP-based techniques: provide resiliency in cloud
middleware infrastructure based on TCP/IP. An approach ex-
ploiting TCP point-to-point in combination to UDP multicast
is low-latency fault tolerance (LLFT) middleware suggested
in [166]. LLFT uses passive and active replication of virtual
connections synchronized by a leader-determined membership
protocol which reduces the complexity of the synchronization.
An example of how LLFT works in the case of a system with
two clients and two servers is presented in Fig. 14. LLFT is
the predecessor of the anycast routing techniques as exploited
in the previously discussed [12], [128], [130], [131].
Fig. 14. Example of a low-latency fault tolerance (LLFT) middleware
approach. a) Normal web service operation where connection (1) sends the
regular request, connection (2) sends an acknowledgment to the primary and
secondary server, and connection (3) carries a second acknowledgment to
confirm the availability of the service. b) Shows an example of fast service
recovery using LLFT with one web server failure (i.e., physical servers or DC
failure), where connection (4) in this case notifies the web server failure and
connection (5) acknowledges to keep transferring data.
2.b) SDN-based techniques: consist in the extension of
SDN protocols to manage/control resiliency of cloud middle-
ware services. SDN is an important enabler for the virtual
connectivity required in cloud middleware [121]. For exam-
ple, PicoReplication framework for SDN middlebox controller
[167] adds a checkpoint functionality for each independent
flow, enabling a novel resiliency scheme on a per-connection
basis.
3. Resilient load balancing and scheduling in middleware:
are techniques that leverage load balancing and scheduling
to provide resiliency in the cloud middleware. A brief survey
about traffic scheduling and load balancing in middleware is
presented in [168], [190] where the main challenges related
to virtualization and diversity of cloud applications demands
and multi-layer nature of schedule are described. Four main
resiliency techniques for load balancing and scheduling in
middleware were surveyed based on trust, locality, redundancy,
and application awareness (see third section of Table IV). Ap-
proaches enabling the resilient load balancing and scheduling
maximize survivability of applications and minimize recovery
time (RT).
3.a) Trust-aware load balancing for resiliency: consists in
a load balancing technique using a trust metric to route traffic
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between VMs and/or servers. One approach using this tech-
nique is trust-based load balance algorithm (TBA) suggested
in [168] to migrate traffic of overloaded or failed VMs to
idle VMs and more trusted data center (i.e., with less failure
records) and reduce the chance of total service disruption.
This approach complements the trust-aware VM migration
discussed before by adding load balancing.
3.b) Locality-aware scheduling for resiliency: consists in
traffic scheduling using the principle of locality (i.e., close-
ness) to provide fast service recovery. A cloud data center
schedules jobs on servers and VMs with diverse characteristics
[168], hence a balance reduce algorithm (BAR) for scheduling
using data locality is suggested in [169]. BAR schedules and
allocates tasks for Hadoop and MapReduce application by
minimizing the job completion time gradually while providing
low RT in case of server failure (i.e., fast rescheduling jobs).
3.c) Passive redundancy scheduling for resiliency: consists
in the utilization of passive replications of traffic or jobs on
servers and VMs to provide resiliency. An approach using this
technique is failure resilient BAR (FR-BAR) suggested in [170]
to schedule replicated jobs. This approach achieves faster job
completion time and RT compared to BAR.
3.d) Application-aware scheduling for resiliency: utilizes
intelligent scheduling of cloud applications on servers or
VMs to provide resiliency. Approaches for application-aware
scheduling follow various scheduling principles: availability
prediction (i.e., trust), redundant placement, and load balanc-
ing. Redundant placement is enabled by load balancing by an
approach suggested in [171] that schedules highly-available
applications in a cloud environment (SHA-APP). Availability
prediction based on stochastic reward nets (SRN) to support
the scheduling of application is applied in Application-level
availability analysis (AA) approach suggested in [175]. A
similar approach to SHA-APP, except for the redundancy
method and platform, is high available application place-
ment (HA-APPlace) suggested in [172]. However, resilient
dynamic placement for real-time applications requires more
strict time awareness to meet the SLO requirements. Hence,
[174] suggests a reliability assessment for general and real-
time cloud computing (RACS) that includes an algorithm to
detect failures and continuously measures the experienced
availability of the application components such that the ap-
plication execution schedule can be adapted to the time-
varying requirements (i.e., delay) of the components and ser-
vices. A more comprehensive approach, combining scheduling
methods with application component dependency awareness
in static and dynamic scenarios, is CHASE, component high
availability aware scheduler in cloud computing environment
[191]. CHASE extends the HA-APPlace approach and its early
version [173] by improving the efficient response to failure
scenarios in the cloud infrastructure (i.e., minimizing RT).
4. Resilient architecture design for cloud middleware. This
category includes a diverse set of studies that aim to provide a
comprehensive solution for a resilient middleware architecture
design. Some of the studies suggest a tight integration of
management modules, or an adaptable resilient architecture, to
address the diversity of resiliency demands of cloud services.
Other studies suggest a sub-layer architecture to be added
between the virtualization and the application layers. Finally,
some other studies suggest service and replication oriented
cloud middleware frameworks to address Byzantine failures
and web services resiliency (Table IV).
4.a) Tight integration of management modules: consists in
approaches based on the integration of existing management
modules from management applications to enforce resiliency.
One approach using this technique is failure tolerance man-
ager (FTM) proposed in [176], [177]. FTM integrates three
management modules to enable comprehensive and adaptable
resiliency in large cloud infrastructure: (i) Resource man-
ager to allocate resources avoiding congestion and failures;
(ii) Replication manager and messaging monitor to enforce
the active replication and grouping of contents; and (iii) Fault
masking and recovery manager to recover failures while
masking them to end users. This integration of management
components enforces failure forecasting, removal, protection,
and recovery of the infrastructure (see Table IV).
4.b) Self-adaptable architectures: are those designed to
provide adaptability of the cloud middleware based on security
and protection requirements. Merkaats [178] creates idle and
changing target applications to confuse the attacker and to
keep the redundancy in case of server failures. The Merkaats
architecture integrates anomaly detection, data replication, and
checkpointing to provide protection and restoration. A similar
architecture is the control operations plane (COP) suggested in
[179] that uses a security scheme similar to Merkaats but with
additional restoration schemes including physical components
(e.g., retry and reboot techniques).
4.c) Resiliency sub-layer: consists in adding a specialized
middleware sub-layer to enhance resiliency in cloud infras-
tructures. For example, the trusted cloud (TCloud) sub-layer
proposed in [180] aims to detect, estimate, and mitigate fail-
ures and Byzantine attacks in federated clouds, by emulating
the functionalities of a virtual switch that enforces traffic
redundancy and adaptability between cloud application and
VMs and self-healing functionalities (e.g., auto-corrections).
The virtual switch can also be replicated to enhance the level
of resiliency for distributed applications. Figure 15 presents
the virtual switch architecture of TCloud with an example
failure in one cloud provider. TCloud reallocates resources
and reassigns trust in components (following the red arrows).
4.d) Service-oriented architectures: are middleware archi-
tectures designed to provide differentiated resiliency based on
the QoS and/or SLO requirements of the supported services.
Adaptive QoS-aware fault tolerance strategy for web services
(AFTWeb) [181], for example, selects and executes the best
recovery technique based on the SLO of the application to
be recovered. Some of the specific strategies implemented in
AFTWeb are: retry and reboot, recovery blocks, and active
replication. A similar approach is high availability config-
uration for cloud (HAC) in [182]. HAC selects and adapts
the same types of fault-tolerance strategies used by AFTWeb
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Fig. 15. Representation of the high-level logical functioning of TCloud
middleware sub-layer [180]. Following the red arrows, first (during failure-
free system operation) TCloud duplicates the image of VM 2 of cloud provider
B into the VM 2 of the cloud provider A. Second, following the black arrows,
when a failure in provider B occurs, TCloud activates VM 2 of provider A
and coordinates the migration of the service towards the safe copy in provider
A.
Fig. 16. High-Available Cloud (HAC) configuration framework. Steps
followed by HAC: (1) the SM@RT module requests the initiation of the
run-time construction model based on current system status; (2) after getting
the information from the cloud unified interface and cloud system, the HA
mechanism selector chooses the best HA style (i.e., the resiliency strategy) for
the requesting tenant application; (3) then the HA style passes (merges) this
information to the run-time approaches; and (4) finally SM@RT synchronizes
the infrastructure status based on new run-time information.
to control VM reload, replication, and relocation. Figure 16
describes the HAC framework, including an example of the
configuration process: as we can see from the figure, HAC
has a similar structure to TCloud (Fig. 15) but it also uses a
module for run-time synchronization called SM@RT. Another
approach similar to HAC is failure tolerance cloud (FTCloud)
[183] which uses a ranking mechanism to support a resilient
resource allocation for tenants with an adaptable selection
of the resiliency strategies based on the SLO of each cloud
application and/or services.
FTM, TCloud, AFTWeb, and HAC provide similar function-
alities, however the main differences are in the selection and
implementation of the fault-tolerance strategies. For example,
HAC uses an effective combination of multiple fault-tolerance
strategies supported at different cloud layers (i.e., virtualiza-
tion and application layers).
4.e) Replication-based architecture for Byzantine-failure
resiliency: consists in architecture design for cloud service
replication to avoid failures cased by Byzantine attacks2.
An architecture called cloud computing fault net (CFN) is
suggested [184] to detect Byzantine failures in large cloud
computing infrastructure using petri-nets and Byzantine failure
patterns at the cloud middleware infrastructure. CFN shows
that, by replicating data and content into 3f + 1 server
replicas, CFN can tolerate up to f failures. However, repli-
cation increases cost in resources and management, hence
[185] proposed an efficient approach to reduce the number
of replicas required for Byzantine-attack resiliency to 2f + 1
servers.
4.f) Replication-based architecture for web service re-
siliency: consists in a replication mechanism to enforce web
services resiliency in cloud middleware. A passive-replication
approach using business intelligence is fault tolerance web
service orchestration (FTWS-O) in [186]. The business intel-
ligence is used to identify critical web services which need to
be replicated. This approach reduces the number of replicas,
but it might not be able to protect against advanced Byzantine
attacks. Another replication-based architecture is the diversi-
fied replica execution and monitoring environment (DREME)
[187] that adds monitoring and lightweight virtualization (i.e.,
operating system virtualization) to replication in order to
enable web service execution in different locations, allowing
to overcome server failures.
Discussion of benefits and challenges for resiliency tech-
niques in cloud middleware infrastructure: Table IV describes
and compares approaches on resiliency in cloud middleware
infrastructures and discusses some benefits and challenges.
The main benefits for cloud infrastructure designers and
providers are: (i) multi-layer integration and management of
resiliency techniques (i.e., resilient architecture design for
cloud middleware) by supporting an efficient integration and
management of multiple resiliency techniques; (ii) comprehen-
sive resiliency planning and operation (i.e., resilient check-
pointing management and resilient load balance and schedul-
ing). The main challenges for cloud infrastructure designer and
providers are: (i) high computational complexity required by
the resource optimization and (ii) measurement and estimation
tools required. To deal with both challenges, measurement and
estimation techniques are essential (Section V-F).
F. Measurement and estimation of resiliency in cloud comput-
ing
As in any system, measuring and estimating resiliency is
an important aspect for cloud computing infrastructure and
applications. Several works focusing on measurement and
estimation were surveyed in [81]. In this section, we introduce
2Byzantine failure resiliency approaches focus mostly in server, cloud in-
frastructures, and applications; however, some approaches suggest Byzantine-
failure tolerance also in cloud middleware infrastructure.
22
Fig. 17. Taxonomy of measurement techniques for cloud computing
resiliency.
some important works by categorizing them in two groups:
empirical and theoretical approaches.
1. Empirical resiliency measurement and estimation: are used
for real cloud computing infrastructures which can be active
or passive. Active approaches induce failures to measure their
effect, while passive measurements amount to logging what
failures actually happen as is.
1.a) Active resiliency measurement and estimation: The
injection of failures and anomalies in a cloud infrastructure
can measure the response to the injected failures. The common
goal is to forecast the recovery time (RT) and survivability ca-
pability and remove weaknesses in the infrastructure (removal)
and choose the correct resiliency approach.
The failure injection can be programmed for each tenant or
for the entire cloud infrastructure to measure a large and com-
plex failure recovery. Some approaches focusing on this strat-
egy are: Failure testing service (FATE) and declarative testing
specifications (DESTINI) [192], and PreFail, a programmable
failure-injection tool [193]. PreFail addresses the complexity
of multiple-failure recovery testing, by using policies to prune
the large space of all possible failure combinations to, e.g.,
a realistic, representative subset for testing purposes. FATE
systematically tests recovery under multiple failures, while
DESTINI specifies precisely the expected recovery behavior.
However, the complexity of cloud infrastructure and applica-
tions is the main limitation of both techniques.
To address large testing of resiliency, failure-as-a-service
(FaaS) defines a set of tools that enable large-scale failure
drills in real deployments [194]. However, since FaaS’ injec-
tion and measurement are limited to one cloud infrastructure
provider, it has been extended to failure scenarios as a service
(FSaaS) [195], large-scale measurements of multiple cloud
infrastructures or federated clouds.
Examples of empirical measurement and estimation in vir-
tualized environments are cloud dependability analysis (CDA)
[196] and D-Cloud suggested in [197]. CDA analyzes the
correlation of various performance metrics with failure events
in virtualized and non-virtualized systems.
D-Cloud enables automated resiliency test procedures, using
VMs with a fault injection mechanism (FaultVM): this enables
tests including hardware faults by emulating hardware faults
by FaultVM.
1.b) Passive resiliency measurement and estimation: The
inclusion of passive applications or devices can capture ab-
normal behavior or performance in regular run-time of cloud
infrastructures and applications.
Empirical passive measurement of failures (in terms of
frequency, reparation time, and cost) has been performed in
operational cloud infrastructure in studies by, e.g., Microsoft
[28] and Google [18]. Similarly, resiliency was measured in
the high performance computing site of Los Alamos National
Laboratory over a period of 9 years (recording various failure
types and their root causes) [198].
2. Theoretical resiliency measurement and estimation: these
methods start from system models and then assess resiliency
metrics by numerical methods or simulation programs. Model
parameters are set in accordance to reality based on previous
experiences, known patterns of events, etc.
Ghosh et al. [199] present a theoretical measurement anal-
ysis of resiliency in cloud computing infrastructure in terms
of job rejection rate and capacity provisioning delay. The
main focus of the proposed method is the use of a stochastic
reward network (SRN) based on petri nets which is used
in some approaches for cloud infrastructure and application
resiliency for estimating the resource availability to place
VMs or contents. SRN is used for resilient cloud application
deployments in the cloud middleware infrastructure [172].
Resilience for virtual infrastructure management systems
(e.g., VM management, Xen hypervisor) is studied in [200]
by suggesting evaluation metrics and selecting the most re-
silient and scalable logical topology (i.e., controller and VM).
Between a centralized, hierarchical, and peer-to-peer logical
topology, the authors conclude that a hierarchical topology is
the most resilient, while a peer-to-peer topology is the most
scalable. Adding the resource management system (RMS) into
the logical topology for physical resource allocation, peer-
to-peer becomes the most resilient and scalable topology for
cloud virtualization [201].
The failure estimation in cloud infrastructure components
typically is based on crude metrics, such as MTBF or just
specifying the mean number of failures. Hence, some studies
suggest more accurate probabilistic models based on the
“risk assessment” of elements in the cloud infrastructure by
combining two key parts: (i) the probability of occurrence of
a failure or an attack and (ii) the expected damage in case
of the occurrence [202]. For the case of failures in cloud
data centers and long-distance optical networks infrastructures,
empirical studies and hazard maps of potential natural disasters
might provide estimation of the probability of occurrence
and expected damage [97]. Attacks can be predicted using
probabilistic models to assess the risk [203]. Studies in [97],
[156], [204], [205] analyze the risk assessment measurement in
communication networks, then [206] suggests the integration
of the risk assessment in the entire cloud computing infras-
tructure.
VI. RESILIENCY IN CLOUD COMPUTING APPLICATIONS
A cloud computing application typically has a web inter-
face that provides access to a set of core objects and data
objects placed with one or many cloud infrastructure providers.
Core objects form the logic of the application: programmed
functions or blocks of instructions, or classes executed by
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Fig. 18. Taxonomy of surveyed approaches for resiliency in cloud computing applications.
an application. These core objects can be developed using
multipurpose programming languages (e.g., Java, C++, C,
Python) and/or with some specific cloud or distributed system
languages/frameworks (e.g., MapReduce [207], DryadLINQ
[208], Pregel [209], or X10 [210]). Data objects are the
content used and/or produced by such logic: related raw data,
database records, content files, etc., stored and managed by an
application. Each cloud application can be placed and executed
in multiple cloud infrastructures that may be geographically
distributed and/or could be multi-tenant.
To provide application resiliency against possible infras-
tructure failures (as well as cyber attacks on the level of the
application layer), both the core and data objects need to be
protected. Conceptually, both object types can be protected
against failures adopting similar ideas. We categorize the sur-
veyed studies according to their core ideas into (See summary
in Table V): (1) resilient application design and development
and (2) resilient cloud collaboration for resource sharing
data/content. The next subsections VI-A and VI-B discuss
each category. Figure 18 summarizes the overall classification,
and also shows how the first category (1) resides entirely in
the application layer, while (2) also involves the virtualization
layer.
A. Resilient application design and development
At the application layer, we identify five main resiliency
approaches: application design, object self-correction, object
replication, object execution, and object placement.
1. Resilient design of cloud applications: Cloud application
resiliency can be enforced in the early stage of design, where
best practices can be adopted to ensure resilient operation. For
instance, the provision, assurance and auditing (PAA) frame-
work [211] suggests the addition of control functionalities in
the design of cloud applications to support the auditing of se-
curity and data integrity. The auditing functionality will allow
the application manager and tenant to evaluate, investigate,
and mitigate future failures and attacks.
Another example is the categorization of best practices in
a so-called Byzantine fault-tolerance (BFT) catalog including
previous Byzantine failures in web services to assist appli-
cation designers [212]. The BFT catalog includes patterns of
critical interactions between sophisticated web service applica-
tions with lessons learned for the application designer to avoid
well-known and preventable errors, attacks, and failures.
2. Resilient self-correcting programming code: Applications
developed and implemented using this methodology enable
self-correction in critical code parts of an object to ensure
resiliency (i.e., self-healing).
In resilient X10 (X10RT), self-healing is realized by main-
taining code snapshots, and falling back to “the best previous
working code” [213]. X10RT extends the cloud computing
application programming language X10 by adding a run-time,
i.e., “memory resident algorithm” [213] that detects and repairs
the logic of any program (i.e., the core object) written in X10
or in a multi-purpose language. Tests in cloud applications
using X10RT showed good recovery capabilities for single
virtual node (VN) failures with a small additional overhead.
3. Resilient object replication: This method enforces repli-
cation of critical objects (both core and data) to protect the
application and user’s data/content. Object replication can be
passive (i.e., a scheme with one standby backup object per
primary, 1:1 protection) or active (i.e., N -version program-
ming, 1:N protection). In both cases, replication also requires
security and synchronization to provide consistent application
protection and recovery.
A Java-based active approach is immune system (ImSys)
[214], which uses CORBA for active object replication to
mitigate and recover malicious attacks and failures. ImSys
relies on a secure multicast protocol to manage secure syn-
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chronization of messages and data between object replicas.
Another active data replication using the checkpoint ap-
proach for deadline driven (i.e., time-constrained) applications
is MillWheel [215]. Tenants or end users using MillWheel
write application objects as individual nodes in a directed
graph with arbitrary topology (where an edge from node A
to B indicates that B processes A’s output). Data objects
are replicated and checkpointed in continuous flows between
edges of the graph (similar to 1+1 protection) in such a way
that, even if any node is corrupted or lost, the application
will not be affected. The MillWheel approach is very useful
for many Google cloud applications (e.g., Google Ads, Google
Street View, etc.). The overhead of this method (i.e., additional
resources for the object replicas and their synchronization)
may limit its feasibility for large cloud applications.
4. Resilient objects execution: This method provides protec-
tion and recovery for distributed cloud applications without
the requirement of full duplication of objects for resiliency
purposes. It adopts a checkpointing approach: in which so-
called “movable data containers” are created to add check-
point, adaptability, and security functionalities for recovery
and protection.
A sample approach that encapsulates critical data objects
is self-controlled objects (SCO) [216]. SCO containers are
generated by end users through wizards to be distributed
across different application domains inside and outside a cloud
provider. Experimental results show how tested distributed
applications with SCO may survive (physical and/or VM)
server failures [216].
Resilient distributed data sets (RDDs) is an object program-
ming abstraction enforcing “read-only, partitioned collection
of records or data sets” to store critical information and to
create self-protected applications [217]. An RDD program-
ming method enforces object protection by storing a data set
in a read-only part of the memory or in different storage
locations of the cloud. RDD elements can be divided and
distributed over multiple VMs by using keys as means to
identify them. RDD can be used in any general-purpose
language and distributed-system-based language.
The main difference between SCO and RDD is that SCO
stores an entire critical object in movable containers while
RDD creates “metadata” of critical objects in a read-only and
fixed location in memory or in safe storage. This metadata can
be used as a checkpoint to recover the application or each indi-
vidual object. The main weakness of the suggested approaches
is their scalability and dependency on the application designer
and developer’s skills.
5. Resilient object placement: These methods use failure
prediction or detection before storing or relocating critical
objects, so as to pick locations with minimal expected failures.
An approach using such ranking to enable resilient object
placement is the “component ranking framework for fault-
tolerant cloud application” (FTCloud) [183]. FTCloud builds
a ranking between cloud components to identify and test
each cloud component and identify the most available. The
higher-ranked components are used to place the objects of the
cloud application. In case of failures or congestion, FTCloud
provides an algorithm to recalculate the rankings and suggest
a new object placement. This approach can work with any
application development framework.
A similar approach to enforce resilient objects placement is
“availability-aware MapReduce data placement mechanism”
(ADAPT) [218]. ADAPT helps MapReduce- and Hadoop-
based applications to mitigate the impact of sparse resource
allocation and node failures (e.g., server or VM failure) by
dynamically placing objects into working VMs and servers to
increase redundancy. To relocate objects in case of resource
exhaustion or failure, ADAPT detects any changes in the
availability of cloud components and suggests relocations,
if necessary. Experiments show a 30% improvement of the
availability when ADAPT is used [218].
The approaches in this subsection have some significant
limitations to handle multiple applications and severe failures
(i.e., multiple cascading failures as in a disaster): survivability
of “application design and development approaches” is mostly
limited to moderate failures and attacks on cloud applications
which include single-server failure and intrusion.
B. Resilient cloud collaboration for resource sharing
The collaboration approaches we now discuss have cloud
providers and tenants sharing computational resources for ap-
plication and data/content replication, distribution, and place-
ment. Approaches of this group extend the cloud applica-
tion survivability to more severe failures and attacks which
include multiple server or data center failures or an entire
cloud provider infrastructure disruption or under cyber attacks
(Table V).
Collaboration along tenant’s applications hosted by the same
cloud provider or different cloud providers can enable resource
sharing and data/content protection and recovery against se-
vere failures scenarios [227]. This scenario also requires
data/content to be replicated, placed, and synchronized.3 Most
surveyed approaches are located in the application layer by
interacting with the upper sub-layer of the virtualization layer
(i.e., the sub-layer of integration and middleware).
We identified five categories of studies, as discussed below.
1. Resilient cloud brokering: Cloud application brokering is
an approach to automatically provide and manage resources
for an application, including its allocation and load balanc-
ing [227]. Surveyed studies focus on two aspects: providing
(i) recommendation to relocate an application in a more
resilient infrastructure (i.e., forecasting and removal), and
(ii) a complete brokering to adapt the resource exhaustion and
failure (i.e., restoration).
An approach for recommendation to support safe multiple
cloud resource replication to enforce resiliency is the “failure
independent cloud application placement recommendation sys-
tem (iRec)” suggested in [219]. iRec acts as an intermediate
3Note that data/content can be a service, a set of services, an application,
a set of applications, a database, or a set of databases managed by a tenant
or by multiple tenants.
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Fig. 19. Resilient content/data coding. a) Normal operation of proxy which codes data between cloud provider (writing and reading). b) Example of failure
scenario where data affected by a failure in cloud provider 1 can be recovered by the proxy. c) Content replication approach, where (1) the content is replicated
and disseminated in three cloud providers and (2) where a failure in cloud provider 1 can be easily be recovered using cloud provider 2.
entity between applications and cloud providers to suggest the
best application placement. The redundancy (and thus also
cost) of application replica is reduced substantially because
iRec manages the information about status of each cloud
provider, including the frequency of failures, congestion, SLO,
and available resources to share. Another important function-
ality of iRec is the trust and security enforcement by hiding
information around tenants and cloud providers.
Another approach suggesting a complete brokering for ap-
plication placement by exploiting the collaboration between
private and public clouds is 1:1 service protection (1:1 SP)
proposed in [220]. 1:1 SP provides protection of private clouds
(i.e., entire cloud application providers) by using public cloud
resources. The approach performs resource brokering using
Markov chains to forecast public cloud availability. Once it
defines the most available public cloud, 1:1 SP places a replica
of each application to enforce resiliency.
A more complete brokering scheme is “self-adaptive cloud
collaboration” (SACC) [22]. SACC first evaluates the “health”
of cloud components (e.g., SaaS application components and
PaaS/IaaS infrastructure components) by measuring the con-
gestion and history of failures. While receiving and processing
cloud application requests, SACC selects the best collaboration
links (e.g., virtual connections and agreements) between cloud
providers before placing the application. Finally, SACC uses
the application placement request, the health of each compo-
nent, and best collaboration links to decide where to place the
application.
After placing the applications, SACC observes the changes
in health of each component (e.g., failure or corruption or
resource exhaustion) and changes in the application require-
ment (e.g., increase of resource usage and SLA requirements)
to relocate applications and contents.
2. Resilient cross-layer cooperation: An approach for multi-
layer cooperation for resiliency to detect and recover failures
is “collaborative fault tolerance management” (CFTM) [47].
CFTM considers three levels of failures: application, VM, and
physical machine. The failures are detected by sensors in the
applications (i.e., at the SaaS tenant side) and VMs (i.e., at the
provider side). The most severe situation is a physical machine
(i.e., server) failure: the provider will recover the VMs of the
failed server in another similar server and ask the tenant to re-
install the application. If the failure occurs in the application or
tenant domain, the provider will offer mechanisms to migrate
or replicate the application.
3. Resilient cloud content storage: Application and content
placement between cloud providers requires resilient data
storage methods. Some surveyed approaches enable net-
work/data coding techniques to provide data/content recovery.
The data/content coding for recovery entails division and
distribution of data/content in coded blocks enhanced with
“erasure segments” that allow the reconstruction of the entire
content from only part of the blocks [228]. Resiliency in cloud
computing has two levels of coding: application/middleware
coding for inter-cloud storage, and system coding for data
recovery in hardware components.
For example, RAID coding techniques in disks and files
for resiliency are very popular in the hardware industry.
RAID-based coding with a proxy for application and content
resiliency is exploited by “redundant array of cloud storage”
(RACS) [221]. RACS splits and distributes user data in blocks
(i.e., buckets) with minimal replication requirements. The
proxy manages block distributions, the reading and writing
operation between cloud providers (e.g., Amazon S3), as
sketched in Fig. 19). The cost reduction is evident due to the
reduced amount of redundant information required compared
to RAID-5.0 type of replication. However, the processing time
in normal operations, and also the recovery time (RT) when
failures occur, can be high.
To reduce the processing time, a more efficient regenerat-
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ing code is suggested in “network-coding cloud” (NCCloud)
[222]. The main strength of NCCloud is the correction cod-
ing, called functional minimum-storage regenerating code (F-
MSR), which allows to maintain the data redundancy with
less traffic and overhead, reducing the recovery time (RT).
NCCloud provides the same resiliency and response time
obtained by the RAID 6.0 in multiple clouds. NCCloud is
designed to recover more severe failure and data corruption
compared to RACS by using more complex regeneration code.
Experimental results with Amazon S3, RackSpace, and Win-
dows Azure cloud providers show the advantages of NCCloud
in term of recovery time and cost [222].
Figure 19(a) presents an example of NCCloud’s read and
write steps in normal operation, and Fig. 19(b) shows a case
of one cloud provider failure.
4. Resilient cloud content dissemination: Cloud oriented con-
tent delivery network (CCDN) is the cloud implementation
of content delivery networks (CDNs), which are specialized
networks connecting distributed storage servers for content
access and replication [229]. CCDN is a fundamental concept
shared by all the following proposals: Fig. 19(c) shows how,
in order to enhance resiliency, tenants (i.e., SaaS application
providers) can exploit content dissemination by replicating
data/content placement in the infrastructure of one or many
cloud providers (e.g., Amazon S3).
A self-adaptive replication approach, called “scattered key-
value store” (SKUTE), was suggested in [223]. SKUTE
provides cost-efficient geographically-distributed data/content
replication. The approach adapts the replication scheme based
on application requirement and types of failures (e.g., physical,
software, and disaster).
A more comprehensive proposal is the “dependable and
secure storage in a cloud-of-clouds” (DeepSky) [23]. Be-
sides content distribution and replication, DeepSky performs
coding of critical data (i.e., resilient data coding), secure
data interchange, and Byzantine quorum (i.e., the best BFT
method [230]) content distribution. Figure 19(c) shows the
main functionalities of DeepSky. A test of DeepSky with four
commercial cloud storage providers (Amazon S3, Microsoft
Azure, Nirvamix, and RackSpace) showed promising results
to reduce the service disruption. An improved version of
DeepSky is presented in [231].
Another cost-effective approach enabling geo-replication
of data/content through multiple cloud providers is “stor-
age provider aggregating networked store” (SPANStore), pro-
posed in [224]. SPANStore integrates geo-distributed federated
clouds by replicating data/content using an asymmetric Quo-
rum. The main goal of this approach is to minimize the appli-
cation cost while minimizing the latency and maximizing the
consistency and resiliency. The application content replication
and distribution performed by SPANStore enforce more time-
and cost-efficient resiliency compared SKUTE. Experimental
results of SPANStore with Amazon S3, Microsoft Azure, and
GCS cloud providers showed a cost-efficient protection for a
case of a server and an entire cloud provider failure [224].
Although the three approaches are quite similar, DeepSky
enables security, protection for case of Byzantine attacks,
and network coding, that are not enabled by SPANStore and
SKUTE. However, DeepSky can face scalability issues in large
and highly-diverse application demands and cloud providers.
5. Resilient access to cloud applications and content: Once
content has been safely placed, resilient remote user access to
it is critical. Several approaches enabling resilient content/data
access focus on this aspect. BlueSky is a file-system-based
approach using a “proxy architecture” to guarantee resilient
access/connectivity to data at application layer [225]. BlueSky
uses the proxy-based architecture (similar to NCCloud) as
another layer in the hierarchy to perform checkpoint backups.
The checkpoint stores the snapshot of the root in the file
system to support a protection and recovery strategy when
a failure occurs.
An approach enabling dissemination and access to
data/content for resiliency using Apache LibCloud is “high
availability and uniform access to multiple cloud storage”
(µLibCloud) [226]. µLibCloud works at the tenant or end user
side, collecting and distributing data from and to different
cloud providers using a simplified coding technique similar
to DeepSky. Experiments over seven cloud providers showed
that µLibCloud significantly increases availability in case of
a catastrophic failure (i.e., disaster or cyber attack), with low
cost and without overhead. Checkpoints increase the robust-
ness of BlueSky, and a network-coding technique optimizes
data access and distribution in µLibCloud.
VII. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
In this section, we conclude our survey with an overall sum-
mary of cloud resiliency approaches, and a short analysis of
major trends and open problems in cloud computing resiliency.
A. Summary of cloud resiliency approaches
The first section of this survey introduced the main char-
acteristics of cloud computing, the service model, the archi-
tecture, the challenges of resiliency, and some preliminary
definitions used throughout this work. In the next two sec-
tions, we categorized and introduced several approaches to
resiliently design and operation of cloud infrastructures and
applications. We also included measurement and estimation
techniques for cloud computing resiliency. Here, we provide
an overall summary of both sections, with a global overview
of all techniques (spanning servers, networks, middleware,
and the application layer) in Table VI, which compares them
in terms of methods, goals, and survivability. We coarsely
refer in the following to basic, mid, and high resiliency level
to indicate both the quality of the resiliency (recovery time
and availability) and the coordination capabilities among the
computing and networking domains of the cloud system. From
Table VI, we observe the following:
1. Server and network resiliency provides the fundamental
survivability for the cloud components (servers and network
equipment). The degree/level of resiliency varies among the
different approaches. A basic resiliency level is achieved by
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protecting against single (physical) server failures (in terms
of both software and hardware). Designers and operators
typically add resiliency functionalities for operating systems
(OSs), physical machines (PMs), and storage to enforce basic
resiliency. A higher degree of resiliency, mid, is reached
through server virtualization: introducing the abstraction of
virtual machines (VMs) enables VM replication, migration,
placement, and checkpointing techniques. However, both phys-
ical and virtual server resiliency techniques rely on the network
within and among data centers (i.e., intra- and inter-DCN) for
transferring and/or updating the VM replicas. These networks
can be virtualized as well, or not, with specific techniques to
make them resilient.
The main method for resiliency of non-virtualized networks
is redundancy. At the (physical) topology level, this may be at
the switch or port level, and may also involve augmentation of
the topology to improve its resiliency. Looking at the actual
routes followed by the cloud traffic (which may span multiple
physical hops), resiliency approaches comprise (i) (re)routing
traffic flows to decide what route to use (possibly to minimize
failures, or rerouting once the original path is affected), and
(ii) provisioning capacity (and possibly extending the topol-
ogy) of the network links such that it also suffices in case of
failures (i.e., accounts for possibly rerouted traffic). The first
amounts to run-time decisions, while the latter can also impact
the planning stage. Virtualization implies that the mapping
of the virtual network (VN) onto the physical infrastructure
needs to be “planned”, which amounts to virtual network
mapping (which, from the perspective of the cloud infrastruc-
ture provider, is also a run-time process, albeit on larger time
scales than routing of traffic over the virtual traffic). Adding
virtualization amounts to multi-layer resiliency, opening up
possibilities for, e.g., cross-layer backup strategies. Another
important concept is anycast routing which can be exploited
to reroute to different data centers, depending on the failures.
Resiliency techniques for networks and servers achieve a
high level of protection against physical failures, basic to high
level against software failures, and basic in case of disasters.
The most resilient techniques for servers are VM placement
and checkpointing. For network virtualization, the higher re-
siliency is achieved by VN mapping with cross-layer resiliency
approaches considering cut-disjoint VN mapping. Software-
defined networking (SDN) resiliency provides a higher level
of disaster resiliency, given the ability to self-replicate and
place the central controller to avoid disaster failures in the
physical network.
In conclusion, isolated resiliency techniques for facility,
servers, and networks can ensure only partial resiliency of the
cloud infrastructure (i.e, processing, storage, or communica-
tion separately), and they target single or a reduced number of
physical or software failures. For large failures (e.g., disasters)
and complex cascading failures, a high level of resiliency
requires coordination of the network and computing part of
system, as discussed below.
2. Resiliency in cloud integrated and middleware infrastruc-
ture integrates resilient techniques for facilities, servers, and
networks to achieve higher levels of resiliency (or do so more
efficiently) in complex failure scenarios compared to separate
strategies for the network/server parts. Most strategies pertain
to cloud run-time and planning processes, with some excep-
tions of architecture design. The most common strategies for
integrated non-virtualized cloud infrastructure are: (i) disaster
and network vulnerability-aware data center/content placement
and connectivity, (ii) anycast and capacity dimensioning for
content placement and dissemination, and (iii) data/content
replication and evacuation techniques.
Cloud networks (CN) exploit virtualization in cloud inte-
grated infrastructure to provide more flexibility and resiliency.
Cloud architecture design has been proposed to allow the
integration of virtual networks (VNs) and virtual machines
(VMs) in cloud networks by enabling resiliency capabilities
for VMs and VNs. Resiliency techniques for cloud network
mapping combine techniques for virtualized networks and
servers resiliency such as: backup-facility node mapping, full
VM or virtual node replication, anycast access to replicated
content, content connectivity guarantee, and data evacuation.
Resiliency techniques for cloud networks build on resiliency
approaches borrowed from non-integrated network infrastruc-
ture, without virtualization. However, virtualization and appro-
priate CN mapping approaches change the picture, as multiple
resiliency techniques can be combined to achieve a high level
of resiliency against software and hardware failures, and mid
level in disasters. The only exception again is Byzantine
attack which depends on the level of awareness used by each
approach to detect and relocate VMs or contents affected by
the attacks.
Finally, several resiliency approaches have been proposed
for implementation in the middleware sub-layer: checkpoint
orchestration, resilient connectivity (TPC/IP and SDN), re-
silient scheduling and load balancing, middleware architec-
tures that build mobile targets for attacks, and service-oriented
middleware architectures.
3. Cloud application resiliency are identified in Table VI,
including the following major trends of surveyed approaches
for cloud application design and operation:
3.a) Cloud application design and development approaches
tend to provide basic and mid levels of application survivabil-
ity for the case of software failures and Byzantine attacks. For
hardware failures, application design and development achieve
just basic levels, given the severe impact of physical failures
on the cloud application.
3.b) Cloud collaboration for resources sharing and
data/content management approaches achieve a higher level
of cloud application resiliency compared to application design
and development approaches, because they exploit inter-cloud
collaboration, resource brokering, and content dissemination
methods to replicate, allocate, and relocate cloud applications.
Most approaches achieve mid level survivability for disaster
failures, however none of them approach support for cascading
failures.
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B. Final remarks and open challenges
The most common resiliency techniques used in cloud
system rely on data replication and checkpointing from the
storage side, virtualization and migration from the computing
side, and multi-layer protection and anycast routing from
the networking side. Given the growing importance of cloud
systems in our daily life, integrated approaches combining
such features, especially to deal with extreme scenarios such
as disasters or intentional attacks, are emerging and represent
an important research direction for the future years.
Open areas in cloud infrastructure and application resiliency
are the following:
1. The aforementioned integration and coordination between
the different approaches for multiple and complex failures
(e.g., disaster and post-disaster failures) is an open chal-
lenge for the “vertical” integration of approaches for cloud-
integrated infrastructures, cloud middleware architectures, and
cloud applications, due to the high computational complexity
required to optimize a very diverse cloud infrastructure (i.e.,
federated clouds). A key enabler for this integration can be the
logical centralization of the vertically-integrated control (as in
the SDN paradigm). However, the optimal control placement
and replication are open research problems.
2. Scalability of (algorithms for) resiliency, as current opti-
mization tools, models, and approaches for cloud systems are
often limited to small problem sizes, but such systems are
continuously growing in size and complexity. In particular,
large coordination problems such as resource brokering and
recovery scheduling (e.g., re-scheduling after disaster events)
are expected to face scalability issues. The exploration of
efficient machine learning based approaches and big data are
also an open research area.
3. Multi-domain extensions to handle cooperative, self-
adaptable, and geo-distributed recovery and protection in inter-
cloud infrastructures (e.g., multi-domain emergency evacua-
tion and recovery).
4. Resiliency in multi-domain and multi-layer network func-
tion virtualization (NFV) [232] to deal with the dynamicity
of cloud computing which requires an efficient and resilient
orchestration of multiple placement and interconnection of
virtualized functions in one cloud provider or in a federation of
clouds (e.g., multi-domain resiliency of multiple cloud service
chains).
5. Interdependency between different infrastructures due to
cascading failures, especially between the power grid and
cloud infrastructure components [233].
6. Mobile and access resiliency for cloud computing services,
given that the increase of access to cloud computing services
from mobile devices will require resiliency for the case of
disruption in 4G/5G mobile access networks [234].
7. Energy-efficient resiliency techniques, as resiliency tech-
niques typically lead to increased energy consumption in cloud
infrastructures.
8. Risk engineering in complex and multi-domain cloud in-
frastructure to improve the preparedness and flexibility of
cloud providers to the uncertainty of failures.
9. Resilient programmability of multiple cloud layers and do-
mains to extend and to integrate existing proposed approaches
using SDN and programmable metro and intra-DCNs (i.e.,
Software Defined Optical Datacenter Networks (SDO-DN)).
VIII. GLOSSARY OF TERMS
• Backup route existence is a topology property requiring
that every source node can reach any destination node
after a failure (e.g., disconnected node or broken link).
• Business continuity plan is a set of procedures designed
to reduce the impact of large failures over service oper-
ations.
• Byzantine attack/failure is an abnormal behavior of a
compromised (i.e., controlled by an attacker) VM or VS
server that produces Denial-of-Service (DOS) attacks on
other services or components of the same server and
cloud infrastructure that might produce important failures.
• Cloud Network (CN) is a set of VMs connected using
a VN, assigned for tenants virtual site (VDS) and/or
cloud application, which also can be used as virtual
infrastructure (VI) [235] or as virtual data centers (VDC)
[136]).
• Critical cut complies a set of links or nodes which,
when failing simultaneously, divide the topology in dis-
connected parts.
• A Data center (DC) facility is a specialized location for
servers or physical machines (PM).
• High nodal degree indicates a high average number of
links connected to each node (which typically implies
that critical cuts will contain many links).
• Migration comprises the relocation of services, data, or
applications from one physical location to another for
resiliency or cost purposes.
• A Physical Machine (PM) consists of a specialized com-
puter with multiple processors and storage capabilities
(i.e., attached storage and network access storage (NAS)).
• Proof of Retrievability (POR) scheme allows the backup
service (the “prover”) to produce a concise proof that a
user (the “verifier”) can recover a specific file or data
content without corruption and interruption [236].
• Resiliency is the capacity of a system or an infrastruc-
ture or a business to remain reliable (i.e., reliability),
dependable (i.e., dependability), failure tolerant, surviv-
able (i.e., recoverable) and secure (i.e., incorruptible)
in case of any malicious or accidental malfunctions or
failures that result in a temporal or permanent service
disruption. Reliability is the probability that a system
remains operative in a period of time. Failure tolerance
is the system’s level of tolerance for a given failure.
Survivability is the capability of a system to survive (i.e.,
recover) a certain kind of failures (i.e., single, multiple,
and disasters) and attacks (i.e., WMD and Byzantine).
Dependability combines reliability, failure tolerance, and
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security. Additionally, survivability refers to multiple de-
pendability towards a diverse type of failures. Security
means data and/or communication integrity, confiden-
tiality, and reliability. Resiliency includes response to
failures or malfunctions caused by security violation (e.g.,
Byzantine attacks/failures) [8], [9], [10].
• Service-level objective (SLO) is the level of quality of
service (QoS) enforced by the service provider based on
the service-level agreement (SLA) with the tenant and/or
end users.
• A Tenant is a user who rents a fraction of the cloud in-
frastructure capacity to provide cloud application services
for end users.
• A Virtual Machine (VM) is the virtualization of computing
and storage on a physical server (i.e., virtual memory
(RAM), virtual hard disk, and virtual processor by using
a virtualized operating system).
• A Virtual Digital Site (VDS) is a set of VMs assigned to
a specific tenant that is considered as single system.
• A Virtual Network (VNet/VN) represent a set of virtual
nodes (i.e., virtual routers) connected by virtual links
allocated (VN mapping) in a shared physical network for
a given tenant or service.
• VN mapping (a.k.a. embedding) consists in the allocation
of resources for a tenant’s VN in nodes and links of a
physical network (i.e., substrate network).
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